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Abstract
This study examines Jürgen Moltmann’s trinitarian theology of the cross in The
Crucified God (1974) in its relevance for the problem of human suffering.
Throughout that volume Moltmann argues that the Christian church’s identity and
relevance are intimately tied into what Christian theology has to say about the
suffering of the crucified Christ through the significance of Christ’s suffering for
the suffering of the created order.
Consciously reversing the soteriological question raised by anthropocentric
contemplation of the cross - what does Christ’s death mean for us? - Moltmann
asks what does the cross mean for God? What does it mean for the doctrine of
God and the problem of human suffering to say that the Son of God was
abandoned by his Father on the cross?
Moltmann attempts to answer these questions through the elaboration of a
theology of the cross that is at once thoroughly incarnational and trinitarian.
Within this theology, the death of Jesus assumes a spectacularly profound
significance as a revelation not only of what God has done for us, but more
particularly of who the God is that is revealed in the event of the cross, as of the
depth of that God’s involvement in the suffering of the world.
Moltmann argues that the crucifixion of Jesus was first and foremost a trinitarian
event in which all three persons of the Godhead participate in Christ’s
identification with, and redemption of, the suffering of the world. In arguing for
the cross as an event within the life of the triune God, Moltmann re-engages the
ancient teachings of theopaschitism and patripassianism which Christian tradition
had previously deemed inadequate and misleading.
The result is a trinitarian theology of the cross which, in its exposition of the
nature of the relationship between divine suffering and the suffering of the world,
is judged to be an innovative and substantive contribution to theological
discussion on the problem of theodicy, involving God’s relationship to the
suffering of humanity and creation.
The study concludes with a summary of scholars’ criticisms of The Crucified
God, together with some suggestions for further research.
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Introduction
The 1900s began with a note of humanistic optimism. As the nineteenth gave
way to the twentieth century there was an air of expectation that humanity had
reached a golden age of maturity. This was perhaps epitomised in the euphoria that
led to the construction and commissioning of three Olympic class ocean liners by the
White Star Line: RMS Olympic, RMS Titanic, and HMHS Britannic. Fierce
competition between Cunard Lines, White Star Lines, and the German passenger
liners resulted in a scramble to secure the biggest, the most luxurious, and most
importantly, the fastest ocean liner. While there are inherent dangers in employing
shallow and simplistic generalisations to describe a complex and multi-faceted
situation, we note Macquarrie’s (1988:19) observation that:
… a certain buoyancy of spirit was evident in most schools of thought at the
beginning of the century, …[a] buoyancy [which] has been more and more
weighed down as the world has become increasingly disjointed and
unstable.

Even the most cursory glance at recent history reveals that such optimism
was unfounded. On its maiden voyage to New York from Southampton the Titanic
struck an iceberg at 11.40 p.m. on the fourteenth of April 1912. By 2.20 a.m. the
following morning the ‘unsinkable’ ship had sunk (Pescher 1997). Not only had the
flagship of the White Star line been lost together with the hopes and aspirations of
those who had confidence in the feats of human engineering, but fully two thirds of
Titanic’s passengers and crew also lost their lives that night. The world was stunned
by the apparent powerlessness of human ingenuity to prevent such a tragedy.
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Such optimism was also called into question when, in the aftermath of a
series of world-altering wars, humanity was forced to admit that it had not
progressed to the point where human beings were capable of continuous and peaceful
coexistence with peoples of other political, religious, or ethnic origins. The twentieth
century, in fact, has witnessed a steady procession of one war after another, one
atrocity after another, and one genocide after another. Idi Amin’s Uganda, the killing
fields of Cambodia, and the ethnic cleansing of the Balkans and Rwanda have all
followed the horrors of the Western Front and the Jewish holocaust. These incidents,
and many other acts of human inhumanity expressed toward other human beings,
have given rise to the question: How is it possible to engage in theology in the
aftermath of Auschwitz, Hiroshima and the Thalidomide children? (Moltmann
1991b:166).
Yet more than simply prompting the question of the possibility of engaging in
theology, these and other acts of unrestrained inhumanity have provided, yet again,
the grounds for the most-cited reason given by people for remaining uninterested in
Christianity and unmoved by its teachings. That reason, according to Nicky Gumbel
(1994:8), is the seeming contradiction between the existence of suffering – in
particular, innocent suffering – and the Christian proclamation of an omnibenevolent,
omnipotent and sovereign God1. C.S. Lewis, in The problem of Pain (1940:14), has
restated the theodicy conundrum in the following manner: “If God were good, He
would wish to make His creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty, He

1

John O’Donnell (1988:14) claims that “Human life reveals so much exploitation, oppression,
persecution, injustice, violation of innocent victims, sickness and death, that it is difficult to believe in
an all-good and all-powerful God, especially in one who is interested in the tragic state of human
affairs.”
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would be able to do what he wished. But the creatures are not happy. Therefore, God
lacks either goodness or power, or both.”
It seems that human beings are still haunted by the shadow that has been cast
by the uninhibited atrocities made manifest in the Jewish holocaust. Who can ever
forget the account of the suffering of the sad-eyed angel who hung between life and
death in Night, Elie Wiesel’s (1960:69-71) powerful recounting of his experience in
Auschwitz? Or the pain contained within the god-forsaken confusion of the witness’s
cry, “Where is God now?” Wiesel’s answer was that God was present, enduring the
suffering of his people, in the person of the slowly suffocating boy. That answer
finds amplification in Jerry Irish’s (1975:25) commentary, “Where is God now? He
is there on the cross – and at Auschwitz, and Memphis, and My Lai, and at all the
unnamed places where death reigns through oppression, ignorance and apathy.”
As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, the world was left with
no doubt that the question of innocent suffering was not simply a phenomenon
confined to obscure and distant ‘unnamed places.’ The whole world community
found itself unavoidably confronted by the reality of events of the eleventh of
September 2001. Innocent suffering was brought to the very centre of international
politics when a group of terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners and deliberately
flew three of them into public buildings in New York and Washington.
Those events caused most of the western world to be struck by a form of
paralysis for several days, such was the scale of devastation. Yet, as great as the loss
of life was on that day, it is dwarfed by some other acts of human brutality. Karen
Rooms (2001:26), for example, reminds us of the seven thousand Rwandan Tutsi,
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men, women and children who, in 1994, sought shelter in a Roman Catholic church
and were murdered there under the light of stained glass windows depicting the
Risen Christ and Pentecost. “Where was he,” she asks, “when the militia came?
Were these people abandoned, or was he right there with them as they gathered in his
name – and as they were killed around the altar because they were different?”
(Rooms 2001:26).
In the aftermath of these tragic events, we must acknowledge that Wiesel’s
question has lost none of its power.
The events of the eleventh of September and all the other events alluded to
above constitute a powerful challenge for the Christian church. How is Christian
theology to presume to speak about an all-powerful and all-loving God in the face of
such overt wickedness? For the fact is, Christianity itself seems so often unable to
provide satisfactory answers inasmuch as “the God who lets the innocent suffer is the
accused in theodicy’s court” (Moltmann 1993c:40). What is left for Christians to say
to a world that is struggling under the burden of the reality that all is not well with
humanity? For while the great majority of Christians would undoubtedly affirm the
reality of Christian orthodoxy’s God, they recognise that
God so rarely seems to accomplish his will in the world. So often God’s
purpose, if it can be discerned, seems to be defeated. The actual
redemptive presence of God in the world is discerned less in God’s taking
the sovereign lead in events and more in God’s picking up the pieces after
history has misfired (Goetz 1986:386).

Nevertheless, it is Christian belief that God is neither absent nor disinterested
in the affairs of the world. For two millennia Christianity has proclaimed Christ’s
glorious victory over the powers of evil at the crucifixion and resurrection as the
central tenet of God’s redemptive provision (e.g., Acts 2:23f; 3:15; 1 Cor 1:23).
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Accordingly, the Christian response to the questions raised by the suffering of the
innocent must be centrally Christological inasmuch as God was reconciling all things
in Christ (2 Cor 5:19). Christianity, moreover, proclaims a risen Christ who is no less
present in the world today than at the crucifixion, and no less involved in the
redemption of all things now than he always was (2 Cor 5:18f). His immediacy to the
world’s problems is no more clearly expressed than in Godfrey Rust’s exposition of
the events of the eleventh of September 2001. Together with Wiesel, Rust asks,
‘Where is God?’ His answer:
… He was begging
in old clothes in the subway
beneath the World Trade Center.
He was homeless in Gaza,
imprisoned in Afghanistan,
starving in Somalia,
dying of Aids in an Angolan slum,
suffering everywhere in this fast-shrinking world;
and boarding a plane unwittingly in Boston,
heading for a meeting on the 110th floor.
When the time came
he stretched his arms out once again to take
the dreadful impact that would pierce his side,
his last message on his fading cellphone
once more to ask forgiveness for them all, before
his body fell under the weight of so much evil (Rust 2001:15).

How, then, is Christian theology to proceed? Throughout the course of the
twentieth century increasing numbers of theologians have been drawn to the
conclusion that Christian theology must re-consider the question of theopaschitism.
Bonhoeffer (1971:361), for example, maintained that “only the suffering God can
help.” Later, Moltmann (1972b:28) claimed that “a God who reigns in a state of
impartial blessedness in heaven cannot be accepted today”, which inevitably led him
to reflect upon the “unsolved problem of the suffering God” (Moltmann 1974a:11).
Classical theism presents God as a being who, by definition, cannot suffer.
For this school of thought, any admission of divine suffering results in the conclusion
-5-

Introduction

that either God’s creation or creatures has the potential to affect God to the extent
that change occurs within God or that God is not complete because some external
‘thing’ was necessary to perfect God’s being. Both conclusions are considered by
classical theists to have the undesirable effect of diminishing the deity of God
(Johnson 1985:152). Yet, in contemporary society, especially since World War I and
II, the concept of a God who remains totally unaffected, indeed beyond any
possibility of being affected, has become more and more problematic. Indeed, it
would appear that increasingly “an apathetic God no longer suffices” (Johnson
1985:154), with the present emerging as a favourable time (kairos) for a revision of
the classical doctrine of the immutability and impassibility of God (Johnson
1985:152).
It would appear that the Christian church will only maintain relevance if what
it has to say about the Christ that it proclaims addresses the questions arising in
peoples’ every-day lives. Among others, those questions have to do with the mystery
of evil and the suffering of the innocent. If Christianity has nothing to say about such
things then the church will indeed be irrelevant. And since Christ is the centre of its
proclamation, the church and indeed Christianity would face nothing short of a
Christological crisis. For many, this is precisely the situation which confronts the
church today. Thus, Moltmann (1974a:6) asks, “Who is Jesus Christ, really, for us
today?”
If, as Christians maintain, God was reconciling the world through Christ, then
Jesus, as the one sent from God, is the one to whom the Christian church must look
for answers to these deeply perplexing questions (Moltmann 1972b:32).
Accordingly, a truly Christian answer can be nothing other than that which is derived
-6-
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from a theology that takes full account of Jesus’ experience of persecution, rejection
and crucifixion. His life and ministry, and in particular his cry of dereliction from
Calvary’s cross (Mk 15:34), offer a far more convincing response to the problem of
suffering than any abstract theological speculation since Christianity proclaims that
God himself has entered into the suffering of creation in the person of Jesus of
Nazareth. Moltmann (1974b:276) argues precisely that when he states that
… God becomes man in Jesus of Nazareth, he not only enters into the
finitude of man, but in his death on the cross also enters into the situation of
man’s godforsakenness. … He humbles himself and takes upon himself the
eternal death of the godless and the godforsaken, so that all the godless
and godforsaken can experience communion with him.

In The Crucified God, Jürgen Moltmann, arguably “the best-known Germanspeaking academic theologian at the end of the twentieth century” (MüllerFahrenholz 2000:15), attempts to re-orientate theology away from speculative
contemplation and toward addressing what he considers to be the most fundamental
crisis facing the Christian church today – the tension between the Church’s identity
and its relevance in relation to a suffering world. He states: “The more theology and
the church attempt to become relevant to the problems of the present day, the more
deeply they are drawn into the crisis of their own Christian identity. The more they
attempt to assert their identity in traditional dogmas, rights and moral notions, the
more irrelevant and unbelievable they become” (Moltmann 1974b:7). For Moltmann,
it was essential that the reconciling of the Church’s identity and relevance in the
context of a troubled world be grounded not so much in “an abstract theology of the
cross and of suffering [as in] … a theology of the crucified Christ” (Moltmann
1974b:4), for only “the scandal and mystery of the crucified God can resolve the
problem of human suffering” (Haar 1983:25).
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This study aims to provide an examination of the theology of the cross in The
Crucified God and its relevance for the problem of human suffering. It will be
particularly concerned to examine the way in which Moltmann argues that the
crucifixion of Jesus was, first and foremost, a trinitarian event in which all three
members of the Godhead participate in their bearing toward the suffering of the
world. Thus, the essay will be concerned to demonstrate that what Moltmann
contributes to theological discussion in the contentious area of divine suffering is
intimately connected to his doctrine of the Trinity and has immediate practical
ramifications for the pastoral ministry of the church.
The inquiry will commence with a brief biographical introduction to Jürgen
Moltmann and discussion of his theological context and methodology, before
proceeding to an examination of the theology presented in The Crucified God. The
primary concern is to analyse Moltmann’s trinitarian theology of the cross and its
significance for the key question of the precise relationship between God and human
suffering.
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Chapter One

Moltmann in Context: Biographical and
Methodological Issues
All human beings are beings-in-context so that their identity and significance
is, in large part, drawn from the context in which they find themselves. This is
certainly true of Jürgen Moltmann whose theological motivation and contributions
are profoundly linked to the question of how it is possible to talk about God in a
post-Auschwitz world. Moltmann (1991b:49) himself answers that “as Germans we
do this in awareness of Auschwitz” precisely because, for him, “[t]heology is never
concerned with the actual existence of a God. It is interested solely in the rule of this
God in heaven and on earth” (Moltmann 1993c:191). And this because when human
beings experience the absence of the presence of God’s rule, it causes them to
question the very existence of God, for if God does in fact exist, then God’s rule
ought not be absent on earth.
Yet for many, simply to exist is a struggle because their life experience is that
God’s rule and divine righteousness are absent from human affairs. Such experience
gives rise to much reflection upon not only the possibility of God’s existence, but
also upon God’s purpose or purposelessness. These concerns are foundational for
Moltmann, because his theology is born out of the desolation of spiritual, cultural
and political upheaval.
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The following brief biographical outline should serve as an introduction to
the extent to which historical and contextual issues have combined to influence
Moltmann’s theology and, in particular, that of The Crucified God. In short, we
… need to examine the inner developments in the life of this man to be able
to understand the elementary decisions and impressions which govern his
work. So the key question is: what are the key experiences which have
given this life its unique direction? (Müller-Fahrenholz 2000:16).

Biographical issues
As a young man of barely nineteen years of age, Moltmann found himself
caught up in the midst of World War II. He experienced several significant lifeforming events during battle and later as a Prisoner of War in European and British
camps. He makes reference to these events in the first chapter2 of The Source of Life:
The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life (1997). Each of those events had a profound
impact upon him and have exerted far-reaching influence on his subsequent life and
work.
In July 1943 he served in an anti-aircraft battery located in central Hamburg.
The eastern part of the city was targeted during the Royal Air Force’s ‘Operation
Gomorrah’ and in one week alone some eighty thousand people died as a result of
the aerial bombardment (Moltmann 1993b:19). In the midst of one of the raids by
allied bombers the battery in which Moltmann served suffered a direct hit. That
incident was to prove nothing less than a point of complete and absolute desolation
for the young German soldier.
2

Moltmann (1997c:ix) notes in the foreword to The Source of Life: the Holy Spirit and the Theology
of Life that the first chapter comprises the text of an address entitled Wrestling with God. A personal
meditation on Jacob’s struggle at the Brook Jabbok, following Genesis 32.25-32. This address was
given by Moltmann at the Bonhoeffer Church, Forest Hill, London on the thirteenth of August 1995 in
remembrance of the place where he ‘discovered’ theology – the theology school of Norton Camp
(1945-1948).
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The friend standing next to me at the firing predictor was torn to pieces by
the bomb that left me unscathed. That night I cried out to God for the first
time: ‘My God, where are you?’ And the question ‘Why am I not dead too?’
has haunted me ever since. Why are you alive? What gives your life
meaning? Life is good, but to be a survivor is hard. One has to bear the
weight of grief. It was probably on that night that my theology began, for I
came from a secular family and knew nothing of faith (Moltmann 1997c:2).

Later, in 1945, Moltmann found that he was one of a number of German
troops who had been overtaken by allied tanks during a battle in Holland and was
captured by Allied forces. He was held in a succession of European prisoner of war
camps before being sent to a Scottish internment camp. In that camp Moltmann
encountered his second catalytic experience:
And then came what was for me the worst of all. In September 1945, in
Camp 22 in Scotland, we were confronted with pictures of Belsen and
Auschwitz. They were pinned up in our huts, without comment. Some
people thought it was just propaganda. Others set the piles of bodies which
they saw over against Dresden. But slowly and inexorably the truth filtered
into our awareness, and we saw ourselves mirrored in the eyes of the Nazi
victims. Was this what we had fought for? Had my generation, as the last,
been driven to our deaths so that the concentration camp murderers could
go on killing, and Hitler could live a few months longer? Some people were
so appalled that they didn’t want to go back to Germany ever again. … The
depression over the wartime destruction and a captivity without apparent
end was exacerbated by a feeling of profound shame at having to share in
this disgrace. That was undoubtedly the hardest thing, a stranglehold that
choked us (Moltmann 1997c:3f).

Yet, in the midst of such anguish Moltmann was given a Bible by an army
chaplain and there he found comfort and solace in the Psalms of Lament. Eventually
he was drawn to the Passion narratives of Christ’s crucifixion, and came to a most
profound understanding of, and identification with, Jesus’ cry of dereliction from the
cross: “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mk 15:34). Indeed it could
be said that Moltmann’s faith and theology have grown out of an awareness of this
verse’s significance (Müller-Fahrenholz 2000:23). While he denies that he ‘decided
for Christ’ in the conventional contemporary sense, Moltmann concedes that there
was a time when he clearly understood that Christ had decided for him and that
moment is recorded in Mk 15:34 (Moltmann 1997c:5).
- 11 -
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There was to be one more crucial and foundationally formative experience for
the young Moltmann. When shifted to Camp Norton in the autumn of 1946, the
expectation of most of the prisoners was that this ‘special’ camp was where “young
Germans were supposed to be ‘re-educated’ for a better Germany” (Moltmann
1997c:6). However, Camp Norton proved to be a uniquely “generous gift of
reconciliation” (Moltmann 1997c:6) where the prisoners of war had the opportunity
to study theology under a succession of truly eminent biblical and theological
scholars. In the summer of 1947, some of those prisoner of war students were invited
to attend the inaugural International Student Christian Movement conference.
Moltmann (1997c:5) claims that that event “turned my life upside down”.
We came there still wearing our wartime uniforms. And we came with fear
and trembling. What were we to say about the war crimes, and the mass
murders in the concentration camps? But we were welcomed as brothers in
Christ, … In the night my eyes sometimes filled with tears.
Then a group of Dutch students came and asked to speak to us
officially. Again I was frightened, for I had fought in Holland, in the battle for
the Arnhem bridge. The Dutch students told us that Christ was the bridge on
which they could cross to us, and that without Christ they would not be
talking to us at all. They told of the Gestapo terror, the loss of their Jewish
friends, and the destruction of their homes. We too could step on to this
bridge which Christ had built from them to us, and could confess the guilt of
our people and ask for reconciliation. At the end we all embraced. For me
that was an hour of liberation. I was able to breathe again, felt like a human
being once more, and returned cheerfully to the camp behind the barbed
wire. The question of how long the captivity was going to last no longer
bothered me (Moltmann 1997c:5f).

The significance of this event is not lost on Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz
(2000:18), one of a number of commentators on Moltmann and his theology, who
summarises this culminative event as “[i]n imprisonment, liberation.”
Moltmann (1991b:166) maintains that even though these prisoner of war
camp experiences initially caused a disintegration of the certainties in his life,
nevertheless in the midst of such uncertainty he found hope through Christianity. It
was this hope that rescued him from spiritual and psychological despair, ensuring
- 12 -
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that he survived the temptation simply to give up. Thus, in the end Moltmann’s
theology is born out of the crucible of life’s questions in the search for truth and
meaning; it
… comes into being in the night of an immediate and cruel proximity to
death, and therefore in the end it is never about learned intellectual games
but about questions of life and death. It does not arise out of the peaceful
and cheerful awareness of an unshakeable certainty in God but out of the
abysmal experience of the remoteness of God (Müller-Fahrenholz 2000:19).

Contextual Issues
Together with the personal experiences of Moltmann which have impacted
upon the development of his theology, the collective experience of the familial and
ethnic groups to which he belongs has also been a formative factor. Moltmann’s
theology has also been influenced by the experience of living with a severely
disabled brother (Moltmann 1997c:33; Gorringe 2001:33), as well as by the
common, shared experience of the German people. Thus, Moltmann’s experience,
and his theology that has developed out of it, is intricately and inseparably bound
together with the corporate experience of the German people.
My biography was shaped, interrupted and radically changed, in a very
painful way, by the collective biography of the German people in the last
years of the Second World War and by a lengthy imprisonment after it. The
‘individual approach’ of my faith and thought and therefore also of ‘my
theology’ is embedded in the collective experiences of guilt and suffering in
my generation (Moltmann 1991b:166).

Moltmann’s theological endeavours cannot be properly read and understood,
therefore, without due regard for his context. His experiences of life have caused him
to conduct his theological inquiry out of that context and those experiences. He
writes “I must stress this because theology for me has never been a neutral scientific
study or an objective doctrine, but an existential experience, which must be
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personally suffered, digested and understood” (Moltmann 1987:vii). The key
experience in Moltmann’s situation, according to Müller-Fahrenholz (2000:23), was
and is nothing other than that “God is precisely present also in Godforsakenness.”
Indeed, throughout his theological struggles Moltmann has been drawn to the
conclusion that the question for theology concerns not so much how it might be
possible to talk about God, but rather how it would be possible not to talk about God
in the aftermath of Auschwitz (Moltmann 1991b:166).
His answer, as has been noted above, is that a post-Auschwitz theology must
be conducted precisely “in awareness of Auschwitz” (Moltmann 1991b:49). This is
so because
… theology after Auschwitz would be impossible, were not the sch’ma Israel
and the Lord’s prayer prayed in Auschwitz itself, were not God himself in
Auschwitz, suffering with the martyred and the murdered. Every other
answer would be blasphemy (Moltmann 1974a:10 ).

Such forthrightness of theological insight, directly derived from Moltmann’s
own experiences of godforsakenness, leads Robert Cornelison (2000:15) to conclude
that two reasons especially require that any attempt to understand Moltmann’s
theological contribution must give due recognition to his context. The first is that
“Moltmann’s work is intimately tied in with the social and political upheaval in postWorld War II German culture”; the second, that his theology is “deliberately and
decidedly political in character, demanding that one always look to the political
sources and results of his theology.” In fact, throughout Moltmann’s work there is a
decidedly marked absence of any attempt to separate academic theological pursuits
from the concerns of life, and hence from the political aspects of human existence.
Evidence for this is no more clearly seen than when Moltmann challenges
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Pentecostal and Charismatic elements within Christianity to review their own
‘neglect’ of the spiritual gifts. He writes
If charismata were not given us so that we can flee from this world into a
world of religious dreams, but if they were intended to witness to the
liberating lordship of Christ in this world’s conflicts, then the charismatic
movement must not become a non-political religion, let alone a depoliticized one (Moltmann 1992:186).

Since this present study is concerned with an analysis of Moltmann’s
theology of God and God’s relationship to human suffering as this is to be found in
The Crucified God, it is helpful to understand the influence that Moltmann’s
experiences during and following World War II have had upon this work in
particular. His own description of his first three books3, of which The Crucified God
is the middle work, is that they “were written from the time for the time, and are thus
to be understood as contextual theology, set within the conflict of contemporary life”
(Moltmann 1991b:173). As with his theology in general, so it is the questions of life
that have given rise to the theological engagement of The Crucified God.
Besides their impact upon his theology, it remains to be shown how
Moltmann’s life’s experiences have also shaped his theological methodology,
particularly that of The Crucified God, the object of this present essay.

Theological Method
Throughout his academic career and writings, Moltmann (1996b:103) has
been concerned to avoid the temptation to develop a theological “immunization
3

The first of Moltmann’s work to gain a widespread readership was A Theology of Hope published in
1965 (English edition 1967). This was followed by The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the
Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology in 1972 (2nd ed. 1973, and English edition in 1974)
and The Church in the Power of the Spirit in 1975 (English edition 1977).
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strategy” that would stand over against any and all internal or external contradictions,
whether in life or in theory. He deliberately resisted the temptation to engage in a
theological abstractionism that lays claim to coherent systematisation of all
knowledge about God because to do so would be to withdraw from life into a fortress
of defendable concepts. Those who retreat into such fortresses are faced with being
‘starved-out’ by their own irrelevance to life, which continues in oblivious disregard
of their construction. Rather, Moltmann desired to speak about God in a way that
was more concerned to articulate what had been ‘discovered’ about God and God’s
work of revelation and redemption, than it was to present these truths suchwise as to
ensure that they were entirely logically consistent. His concern was, and remains, to
engage in a theology of listening as much as of pronouncement, of dialogue between
partners rather than one of

“monological dictatorship” (Moltmann 1996b:103).

Truth, for Moltmann (1993c:xiif), therefore, resides in the freedom of open dialogue
within the community of believers and is not solely located within an unswerving
adherence to a dogmatic position.
This opens the door for theological innovation expressed in a more creative
and adventurous approach where theology becomes experimental, indeed an
adventure in ideas (Moltmann 1996b:passim). Moltmann freely admits that his
theological methodology is nothing other than an articulation of an “imagination for
the Kingdom of God in the world and for the world in the Kingdom of God”
(1996b:103). As such, it produces a theology that is “neither modernist nor
fundamentalist, directed neither toward conformity nor retreat, but toward the future
of God and of life” (Moltmann 1996b:103).
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It has been observed above that Moltmann’s reading of the passion of Christ
was one of a number of formative experiences in the development of his theology. In
particular, Jesus’ cry of dereliction from the cross (Mk 15:34) forms not only a key
point in Moltmann’s own spiritual journey, but also forms the central insight of The
Crucified God. Jesus’ cry, uttered in “a loud voice” (Mt 27:46; Mk 15:34), is nothing
other than the articulation of his confusion, frustration and outrage at his, apparent,
abandonment by God.
Moltmann’s analysis of the crucifixion events and the apparent separation
between Father and Son is founded upon a dialectical epistemological principle
where like is known via recognition of unlike, rather than the analogical
epistemological principle where like is known by like. In fact, Moltmann (1974b:27)
argues that “revelation in the opposite” creates the very possibility of the analogical
epistemological principle. He also contends that a theology of the cross that is
founded solely upon the analogical principle can only ever result in a theologia
gloriae (Moltmann 1974b:28). The adoption of a dialectical methodology is
important for Moltmann as a basis upon which to argue for the relevance of the cross
to a suffering world. His point is that the omnipotent God is revealed in the
impotency of the crucified one, and the love and provision of the Father is known by
his resurrection of the one who was abandoned. The Son’s experience of godlessness
and godforsakenness in abandonment is nothing other than his identification with all
of those who are also victims of violence – the ‘godless’ ones. For Moltmann, the
adoption of a dialectical method is important, for insofar as God is revealed in his
opposite, he can thereby be known in and by the godless and those who are
abandoned by God, a knowledge which brings them into correspondence with God.
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“It is the dialectical knowledge of God in his opposite which first brings heaven
down to earth of those who are abandoned by God, and opens heaven to the godless”
(Moltmann 1974b:28).
Moltmann’s intention was also to argue for the existence of “an irreplaceable
dialectic between cross and resurrection” (O’Donnell 1982:161). Indeed, the death of
Christ on Calvary’s cross is a unique event in the history of God’s self-disclosure to
his people: “an event of divine kenosis in which the trinitarian life of God is thrown
open for all to see” (Dabney 1993:97). Yet, the interpretative key to this event lies
within the “identity-in-contradiction” (Bauckham 1987:56) that exists in the person
of the crucified and the risen Jesus – i.e., in the fact that it is none other than the
godforsaken and abandoned one who is also the godblessed and resurrected one. As a
result, the Christian cannot know the eschatological promises of resurrection and
eternal life other than through the godforsakenness of the Son’s abandonment by the
Father.
However, this orientation has led some commentators, Douglas Meeks
(1996:96) for example, to suggest that Moltmann’s theology is one-sided and overly
speculative.
With regard to the accusation of one-sidedness, Moltmann (1987:ix;
1991b:165-182; 1993c:xi) openly acknowledges that in his first three books a single
focal point of inquiry inspired and was pursued throughout each of those works.
However, he argues in his own defence that the singularity of focus then employed
was and is not a liability but a distinctive strength, flowing out of his particular
concern to intentionally engage not only in dialectical but in dialogical theology:
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… theology in dialogue is theology engaged in the struggle for the truth,
which liberates, and in opposition to nihilistic ideologies, which oppress. So
dialogical theology cannot be timeless or without location. It must forego
correctness in order to be concrete. It cannot afford balance, but must take
sides and speak onesidedly. Its intention is not to satisfy itself, but to make
a contribution to the healing of everything in church, culture and creation
(Moltmann 1987:viii emphasis added).

For although, as previously noted, Moltmann employed a dialectical
epistemology, he came to understand, according to Lyle Dabney (2000)4, that the
weakness of dialectical theology lay in the realisation that “simply to contradict is
not to transform, and transformation is what his thought is all about.” Moltmann
(1993c:xiii) himself writes:
It is only in free dialogue that truth can be accepted for the right and proper
reason – namely, that it illuminates and convinces as truth. Truth brings
about assent, it brings about change without exerting compulsion. In
dialogue the truth frees men and women for their own conceptions and their
own ideas. In liberating dialogue teachers withdraw into the circle of
brothers and sisters. The pupil becomes the friend. Christian theology would
wither and die if it did not continually stand in a dialogue like this, and if it
were not bound up with a fellowship that seeks this dialogue, needs it and
continually pursues it.

As to the allegation that it is overly speculative (Meeks 1996:96), Moltmann
(1975:646; 1996b:103) defends his work by replying that ‘speculation’ is not
considered a derogatory term in German academic circles. In fact, to speculate
presupposes that one is engaged in a process that retains an all-encompassing view of
the whole, especially the relationships existing between the individual inquirer, the
influence of his/her own context with all of its associated biases and presuppositions,
and the object being considered. Abstractionism, on the other hand, is doomed to
failure because it is an attempt to seek out the truth about a matter while the inquirer
either remains blinded to the influence of his/her own context, or simply ignores its

4

This article was accessed in an electronic format and, therefore, individual page breaks and numbers
throughout the article were unavailable. As a consequence, in-text citation of this work does not
include page numbers. However, complete bibliographical data relating to the print version of the
article was available and has been included, in full, in the bibliography.
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impact upon their endeavours to objectively study the topic under discussion.
Moltmann moreover contends that it is entirely acceptable to formulate statements
that extend thought beyond that which remains logically ‘provable’, because of the
phenomenological validity of the theopoetic enterprise, an enterprise which is at base
a poetic and joyful doxological expression of knowledge of God, using ideas that
transcend present experience (Moltmann 1996b:103).
Notwithstanding the allegations of a tendency toward a one-sided and an
overly speculative theological methodology, Moltmann has produced “a powerful
eschatological theology from the raw ore of various theological, philosophical, and
historical materials in the fire of the struggle he faced in post-war Germany”
(Dabney 1993:89). Just as his own experiences of godforsakenness issued in a unique
theological passion within himself, so Moltmann (1991b:172) sought to articulate his
belief that the centre of Christian theology should be nothing other than Christ’s
experience of godforsakenness and abandonment during the event of the crucifixion.
Moltmann (1974b:47) claims that such understanding led him inexorably to that
“monstrous phrase ‘the crucified God’.”
Although Moltmann’s volume The Crucified God has “produced a firestorm
of controversy which perdures in some forms even today” (Freske 2000:85)5, it
5

Ronald Goetz (1986:385), for example, describes a rise in the acceptability of divine passibility as
“the new orthodoxy”. Moltmann (1991b:xvi) himself contends that the “doctrine of the essential
impassibility of the divine nature now seems finally to be disappearing from the Christian doctrine of
God.” Such sentiments have led Shirley Guthrie (1996:22) to claim that the “doctrine of the
sovereignty of God, especially as it is expressed in the Calvinist-Reformed tradition, is being attacked
from all directions today.” The debate, it seems, is set to pass over into the twenty-first century since
Thomas Weinandy (2000) has recently devoted an entire volume to an examination of the theological
trend toward the normalisation of the view of God’s passibility, which, in his view, contradicts
centuries of belief in God’s impassibility (see also the discussion of divine apatheia in O’Brien
2000:passism; Parsons 2002:passism). At the same time, proponents of Free-will theism (also known
as Opentheism or Neotheism) argue that the doctrine of divine impassibility “arises more from Plato
than from the Bible” (Pinnock 1994:118) while taking a significantly different position than that
proposed by Moltmann in The Crucified God. It should be noted that where Weinandy rejects the
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contains the central tenet of Moltmann’s theology, viz., that Christ crucified is “the
irreplaceable criterion of theology” (Meeks 1996:98). For the centrality of a crucified
Christ demands that the “cross is either the Christian end of all theology or it is the
beginning of a specifically Christian theology” (Moltmann 1972b:32).
Moltmann (1974b:65ff) maintains that such a specifically Christian theology
will serve as a “critical theory of God” and a “crucifying theology”. These ideas are
located and articulated in his use of the double expression ‘godlessness and
godforsakenness’. These terms refer not only to the experience of the crucified one;
but also to the experience of all the other godless and godforsaken ones who are
‘crucified’ daily in the struggle for existence in a world marked by the absence of the
presence of divine righteousness (Bauckham 1987:61). The Crucified God is the
result of Moltmann’s reflection upon his own experience of godforsakenness and the
apparent absence of the presence of God in the world. It seeks to address this
experience of absence by expounding “a full-fledged theology of the cross”
(Rumscheidt 1974:355), indeed a ‘theology of the cross’ in Luther’s sense6
(Bauckham 1989:249f; 1995:3). To “a world that in misery and despair cries out for
a ray of hope, this book [The Crucified God] seems to take the reality of suffering
and death utterly seriously” (Runia 1984:42).
This discussion has so far considered the impact that biographical, historical
and contextual issues have had upon Moltmann’s theology, both as to its content and

trend toward this ‘new orthodoxy’, Goetz (1986:389) observes that although there may well have been
a paradigm shift in theological consideration of divine (im)passibility, “doctrinal consolidation of that
revolution [is] far from complete.”
6

This assessment is not without it critics. Stephen Williams (1989:10), for example, questions
whether it is possible to accurately describe Moltmann as a theologian who can be correctly
interpreted as following the tradition of Luther.
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its methodology. It has shown that his theology has developed out of the key
formative experience that God’s presence can be known even in the depths of
godforsakenness. These biographical, historical and contextual issues have not only
influenced Moltmann’s theological motivation, but have led him to the formulation
of the core theological insight articulated in The Crucified God: i.e., the immediate
presence of the Father in the Son’s experience of godforsakenness on Calvary.
An examination of Moltmann’s portrayal of divine suffering in The Crucified
God and the implications that that divine suffering has for the suffering in and of
creation forms the primary focus of the next two chapters. Of especial interest will be
the way in which Moltmann employs the dialectic of abandonment and abandoning,
absence of the other’s presence, and the presence of the other in seeming
abandonment, to speak about divine suffering. It will be shown that it is precisely in
the cry of the abandoned Son (Mk 15:34) that the cries of the suffering creation
(Rom 8:22f) are heard, incorporated, and finally, redeemed.
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The Trinity and The Crucified God
The most casual of readings of twentieth century history would reveal that a
series of social, political, economic and diplomatic crises in Western Europe
ultimately led to two world wars. The tragic loss of human dignity resulting from the
aggression and inhumanity manifest in those two world wars provided the impetus
for some Christian theologians to undertake a re-evaluation of the doctrine of God in
God’s relation to the violence and suffering of the world. Their work was prompted
by the pressing realisation that the magnitude of the violence and horror associated
with those and other events provided unequivocal evidence that all was not well with
human nature. Indeed, they were painfully aware that in the aftermath of two world
wars, it
… appeared that humanity could be more brutal than the beasts, that
human moral progress was a charade, and that evil and suffering were a
fundamental part of human existence. Talk about an impassible, immutable
God was for many simply inconceivable. How could God be love and not lay
wounded on the battlefields of France? Only a God who suffered with the
victims of war could speak to the disillusionments created by the war (Goetz
1986:387).

This process ultimately led authors like John Hick (1966:280) to question
whether the undeniable presence of evil presented such a profound challenge to the
orthodox Christian affirmation of a wholly good and loving divine Being as to render
impossible continuance of a rational belief in an omnipotent God.
Christian theology was being confronted afresh with the logical conundrum
posed by the theodicy issue. The justification of God, it seemed, was very much still
an open question. For many centuries philosophers and theologians had been
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struggling to find a way in which reconciliation could be brought to the logical
contradictions inherent in a belief in an all powerful, omnibenevolent Creator and the
indisputable evidence of the existence of evil. In the aftermath of the atrocities of war
in the twentieth century, and the two world wars in particular, the awful reality of the
presence of evil ruled out any conclusion that the ‘good’ had, or even would,
triumph. And yet, for Christians, the prospect of the triumph of evil was equally
unacceptable because it would have meant that all hope had been surrendered in the
denial of any saving efficacy to the death and resurrection of Christ.
The realisation by some theologians that Christian theology had not
adequately addressed the problem of the existence of evil continued to prompt
theological reflection upon the possibility of divine suffering and the relevance it
might hold for the suffering of the world.
Moltmann rejects any resort to a facilely abstract approach in his attempt to
address this issue. Rather his approach involves engaging the immediacy of life with
its challenges in an attempt to provide a truly realistic and life-promoting theological
response to the problem.
His first move in this regard is to concentrate upon the radical nature of the
incarnation. Throughout The Crucified God, Moltmann argues that, contrary to the
general tendency of evangelical Protestant theology, the incarnation must take
precedence over purely staurological concerns because one cannot truly comprehend
what took place at Calvary without first knowing who it was that hung upon the
cross. Moltmann’s insistence here is calculated to guarantee the priority of God’s
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action in redemptive history, a move that finds support in von Balthasar’s (1990:11)
declaration that
Were we to … regard the Passion as the centre of everything, with the
Incarnation simply a means to that end, should we not then make God’s
self-glorification in this world dependent on human sin, and reduce God
himself to an instrument for promoting the purposes of the creation?”

Furthermore, since God’s action in redemption is revealed in the person of
Jesus Christ, crucified and risen, any discussion of who it is that was crucified on
Calvary can, for Moltmann, only be conducted using personal, relational, and finally
trinitarian concepts and language. Thus Moltmann’s answer to the theodicy question
is ultimately, as we shall see, a trinitarian one.
Before any attempted exposition of what Moltmann has to say about the
precise nature of divine suffering and its relatedness to the suffering of humanity, it
is important to note the background tradition against which he develops his thought.

The Tradition
Moltmann (1974b:214) asserts that traditional Christian theism is thoroughly
imbedded with metaphysical conceptualisations, and that metaphysics itself has
always conceived of divine reality as all that finite beings are not. He claims, for
example, that theism depicts God as an all-powerful, perfect and infinite being, while
human beings are helpless, imperfect and finite (Moltmann 1974b:249).
Classical metaphysical theory afforded protection against the terror of
nothingness that would threaten to overtake mortal human beings if change, chaos,
suffering, and death were judged to exist within the divine. These negating
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influences were therefore excluded from the divine being because divine
omnipotence compensates for human impotence, divine omniscience counters
limited human knowledge, while divine omnibenevolence guarantees that the lack of
love evident within humanity will not triumph. Similar thinking lay behind the
metaphysical concepts of immutability and impassibility being applied to God. And
this because if, for example, the divine being was subject to passions, as human
beings are, then it was deemed conceivable that created reality might exert such
coercion upon the Creator, by way of inflicted suffering, as to effect some change
upon or within the divine being.
According to Moltmann, however, a God who cannot suffer is also one who
cannot love because love presupposes relational involvement; and relational
involvement, by definition, excludes any notion of unconcerned insensitivity toward
the other. In fact, an impassible God is “so completely insensitive, he cannot be
affected or shaken by anything. He cannot weep, for he has no tears” (Moltmann
1974b:222). In the end we are faced with the prospect that if the God of the Bible is
to be identified with the impassible God of metaphysics, the cross is then necessarily
evacuated of any notions of deity because God cannot suffer and die (Moltmann
1974b:214).
However Moltmann (1974b:215) suggests that the biblical record is nothing
other than the announcement that something new and radical has taken place in the
cross of Christ. He maintains that if the cross (and resurrection) is to remain as the
central tenet of the Christian church’s proclamation, as it was for the apostolic
preaching (1 Cor 1:18-25; esp. v23; 1 Jn 3:16), it must be recognised to herald the
arrival of some new thing in the metaphysical world. Indeed, Christian theology must
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henceforth “think of the suffering of Christ as the power of God and the death of
Christ as God’s potentiality” (Moltmann 1974b:215) because therein lies the
possibility that human beings might be freed from the limitations of suffering and
death. Whereas traditional theism sought to provide protection against the limitation,
finitude and vulnerability of mortal beings by means of a divinity which could not
suffer or die, Christian faith has proclaimed that “God suffered in the suffering of
Jesus, God died on the cross of Christ, … so that we might live and rise again in his
future” (Moltmann 1974b:216). As a result, Christian theology’s challenge is to
adequately differentiate the God of the Bible from the god(s) of the pagans and the
philosophers (Moltmann 1974b:215).
To do so, Christian theology, according to Moltmann (1974b:227), must
revisit the ancient theopaschite formula if it is to think of ‘God in Christ’ rather than
God in absolute metaphysical terms. Indeed, he argues that before it presumes to
speculate about
… the history of Christ’s suffering for the history of the world’s suffering,
Christian theology must have faced the intrinsic problem of the history of
Christ’s suffering and have understood God’s being in the godforsakenness
of Christ. Only when it has recognized what took place between Jesus and
his Father on the cross can it speak of the significance of this God for those
who suffer and protest at the history of the world (Moltmann 1974b:227)7.

To argue for divine passibility, Moltmann (1974b:267) engages in a
discussion of pathos and God’s alleged apatheia. He claims that apatheia was a
metaphysical axiom in the ancient world, which in its pluriform interpretations was
used for governing conceptions of the divine: “In the physical sense apatheia means
unchangeableness; in the psychological sense, insensitivity; and in the ethical sense,
7

This understanding finds support in Burton Cooper’s (1992:179) assertion that “God could not be
God without suffering because those who do not experience the suffering of the other do not
understand the reality of the other.”

- 27 -

The Trinity and The Crucified God

freedom.” Pathos, on the other hand “denotes need, compulsion, drives, dependence,
lower passions and un-willed suffering” (Moltmann 1974b:267).
However, when considered from a biblical perspective it is evident that the
“concept of an apathic God is inevitably alien” (Moltmann 1974b:271) to the JudaeoChristian tradition. In the experience of Israel, for example, Israel’s God is a God
who, in his concern for his people, effectively delivers them out of Egypt, provides
for their sustenance in the desert, and who ultimately provides them with a land of
plenty. Throughout Israel’s history, and particularly through its prophets, God
repeatedly calls his people to return to faithfulness and obedience. This concern for
the welfare of his people is such that it is none other than God himself who
accompanies Israel into the sufferings of the Babylonian exile (Moltmann
1974b:273). For Christians, this passion of God for his people, and through them for
all peoples, reached its ultimate expression in the Christ event where God the Son
became flesh so that there might be a way for all people back into relationship with
their Creator. In the incarnation, when “God becomes man in Jesus of Nazareth, he
not only enters into the finitude of man, but in his death on the cross also enters into
the situation of man’s godforsakenness” (Moltmann 1974b:276).
For Moltmann (1974b:226), a God who is foreign to suffering and “who sits
enthroned in heaven in a glory that no one can share is unacceptable” simply
because, for him, the God who embraces the agony and suffering of crucifixion
contradicts in the starkest possible way the impassible God of metaphysical theism.
The point that Moltmann is making here finds its fullest expression in the
introduction to History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian Theology
(1991), where he writes “I have therefore replaced the metaphysical axiom of the
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essential impassibility of the divine nature with the essential passion of the eternal
love of God” (Moltmann 1991b:xvi).

Divine Suffering
The importance of The Crucified God for Christian theology derives from
Moltmann’s insistence that “God’s being is in suffering and … suffering is in God’s
being itself” (Moltmann 1974b:227). How is it that Moltmann can make such a
startling claim when the majority of Christian theologians before him refused to
recognise the possibility that God could suffer, let alone affirm that suffering had
been taken into God?
Moltmann’s (1974b:227) answer commences from the scriptural assertion
that “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8, 16) and proceeds to argue from the fact that simply
because traditional orthodox Christianity affirms that God is incapable of suffering –
which to admit would, according to the traditional view, argue for some deficiency of
being in God – does not, in and of itself, rule out the possibility that God may
embrace suffering out of a fullness of God’s own being, viz., out of the fullness of
God’s love. Moltmann (1974b:230) argues that a rejection, as with the tradition, of
the notion of God’s (passive) suffering need not necessarily preclude the active
suffering of a God who acts out of love because, as noted above, love presupposes
sensitive relational involvement.
According to Moltmann (1972b:31), then, “God does not suffer, like his
creature, because his being is incomplete. He loves from the fullness of his being and
suffers because of his full and free love.” This same argument is repeated in his later
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work. In The Trinity and the Kingdom: the Doctrine of God, for example, Moltmann
(1993c:22) argues that if we are to understand the suffering of Christ as nothing other
than the suffering of a passionate God, we must then abandon the notion of apathy as
the starting point for any inquiry into the possibility of a suffering God. Instead,
Moltmann (1993c:23) asserts that it is acceptable to argue that God’s active, willing
embrace of suffering is something that promotes rather than diminishes the
perfection of God’s being, for “God does not suffer out of the deficiency of his
being, like created beings. … But he suffers from the love which is the
superabundance and overflowing of his being” (Moltmann 1993c:23). God’s
suffering does not indicate incompleteness within the being of God, as if God were
lacking something; rather, God’s suffering issues forth from God’s completeness.
Because God is complete in every respect he is able to suffer without any threat to
his being. But if God’s suffering derives, not from any deficiency in being, but is the
eruption of an abundance of love, this love can be nothing other than the outward
expression of the relational communion of the three divine persons in their intratrinitarian relationships, as this is to be found in John’s statements “God is love” (1
Jn 4:16), a “God [who] so loved the world …” (Jn 3:16). Indeed this very point is
central to Moltmann’s entire thesis of The Crucified God: the death of Jesus is the
revelation not only of what God has done, but also of who God is in his relationship
to the world.
In the end, Moltmann’s answer to the issue of divine passibility is grounded
in the incarnation and the cross and as such can only be understood in
incarnational/trinitarian terms, for the God who suffers and redeems in Christ is a
God revealed as personal and relational. Redemption is effected in the person of
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Jesus Christ precisely because it is in him that the passionate concern of the triune
God for all people becomes incarnate. It is in this connection that Moltmann
(1974b:236) criticizes a tendency toward a "weakly Christianized monotheism”, a
criticism which finds its resonance in Karl Rahner’s (1974:10) observation that most
Christian believers are practical ‘monotheists’ since most Christian theology and
ecclesiology is not informed by a thoroughly integrated trinitarianism. According to
Rahner (1966:79), Christians, by and large, may be said to subscribe to an
impoverished theology of the incarnation if the event to which they refer is merely a
modalistic, and not a fully trinitarian, incarnation.
Moltmann (1974b:236) extends Rahner’s critique by claiming that it is not
merely the doctrine of the incarnation that is affected by an impoverished
trinitarianism, but also the doctrines of grace, creation and eschatology. It is here that
Moltmann locates the root cause of the Christian church’s crisis in identity: viz., the
acceptance of a weak modalistic Christianity in place of a thoroughgoing trinitarian
theology. He argues – and this is his principle concern in his efforts to rethink the
tradition’s position on God as apathetic – that such practice weakens Christian
theology’s ability to ‘speak’ about the relevance and relation of God to creation’s
suffering. According to Moltmann (1974b:24f), it is precisely this ‘ability to speak’
about the experiences of suffering encountered by God in the crucifixion of Jesus
that constitutes the relevance and validity of the Christian church’s message to a
suffering world.
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The Rise of a ‘New Orthodoxy’
In its presentation of a distinct and cogently argued challenge to the classical
view that God is impassible and immutable, The Crucified God was but one of a
number of works8 that argued for the possibility of divine passibility. These attempts
to investigate and expound the relationship between God and suffering, according to
Ronald Goetz (1986:385), have led to the normalisation of the view that God suffers,
a view that is finding increasing acceptance as the “new orthodoxy.” In fact, almost
two decades after The Crucified God was published, Moltmann (1991b:xvi) claimed
that the “doctrine of the essential impassibility of the divine nature now seems finally
to be disappearing from the Christian doctrine of God.”
The Crucified God, first published in German in 19729, is widely considered
to have been a significant turning point in the process of re-evaluation of the
relationship between the suffering of creation and the divine response to such
suffering. In that work Moltmann (1974b:201) argued that, on the one hand,
preceding evangelical Protestant theology had only been concerned with the salvific
import of the cross of Christ for humanity; indeed, that the cross was viewed simply
as an object of soteriological contemplation and speculation. On the other hand,
however, Protestant Jesuology advocated the view that Jesus’ crucifixion simply
provided a moral example that his disciples were encouraged to follow. According to
Moltmann both approaches are asking the wrong question of the crucifixion event.

8

Thus, in 1946, Kazoh Kitamori published Theology of the Pain of God, a work which claimed to be
the first original Japanese theology (Meyer 1962:262f). In that volume Kitamori (1958:147) argued
strongly that “the pain of God gives meaning and value to human suffering.”
9

Jürgen Moltmann’s Der gekreuzigte Gott: Das Kreuz Christi als Grund und Kritik christlicher
Theologie was published by Christian Kaiser Verlag, Munich, with a second German edition
appearing in 1973. SCM Press of London published the English translation (The Crucified God) by
R.A. Wilson and John Bowden in 1974.

- 32 -

The Trinity and The Crucified God

Rather than ask what does the cross mean for us – either in terms of salvific benefit
or moral example – Christian theology should be concerned with asking first what
does the cross mean for God in order only then to ascertain the significance of divine
suffering for the world. It was his view that such an approach would lead to “a
revolution in the concept of God”10 (Moltmann 1974b:201).
Similar views are also to be found elsewhere within Protestant theology. Karl
Barth (1957:123), for example, maintains that the crucifixion of Jesus is a revelation
of the nature of God precisely because the crucified Jesus is none other than the
“image of the invisible God.” Barth’s Christocentrism led him to relate the doctrine
of the two natures of Christ with that of the two states such that “the divinity of Jesus
is revealed precisely in his humiliation and his manhood in his exaltation”
(Moltmann 1974b:203).

10

This kind of thinking is not restricted to the theology of Moltmann. Similar approaches are to be
found in Roman Catholic theologies of the same era. Among these the most notable is perhaps that of
Karl Rahner, a German Jesuit, who argues that if Christian theology insists upon claiming that only
the human reality of the incarnate Logos suffered upon the cross, then “only half the truth has been
stated” (Rahner 1969:207). Rahner advocates that it is much better to understand the crucifixion as the
revelation of God’s will-to-act as God-is-in-God’s-own-self because, properly understood, “Jesus’
death belongs to God’s self-utterance” (Rahner 1969:208). Thus, Jesus’ crucifixion is nothing other
than a statement about, and revelation of, God-self and God’s purposes.
Similarly, Hans Urs von Balthasar (1990:71ff), another major Roman Catholic theologian, treats the
crucifixion as a revelatory event leading to greater knowledge and understanding of God. Moltmann
(1974b:202) argues that von Balthasar’s theology is more sophisticated than Rahner’s in that it traces
“the self-surrender, the grief and the death of the crucified Christ back to the inner mystery of God
himself and conversely finds in this death of Jesus the fullness of the trinitarian relationships of God.”
This is clearly seen in von Balthasar’s (1990:49) claim that:
If without the Son no one can see the Father (John 1, 18), nor anyone come to the Father
(John 14, 6), and if, without him, the Father is revealed to nobody (Matthew 11, 27), then when
the Son, the Word of the Father is dead, then no one can see God, hear of him or attain him.

Von Balthasar (1990:125) contends that Jesus’ cry of dereliction from the cross (Mk 15:34) can only
be understood from within its own theological context where “that word [i.e., the cry of Jesus] directs
us to the unique point which is Jesus, and in no way to the beginning of a psalmic recitation which
finishes with the glorification of the suffering individual.” He argues that the central biblical message
is that the Son of God bore the full weight of the sin of humanity on the cross (Rom 5:15-21), died in
godforsakenness, was buried, and was resurrected for the justification of believers (Rom 4:25). And
this, according to von Balthasar (1990:122),
… is not myth, but the central biblical message … [so that] where Christ’s Cross is concerned,
it must not be rendered innocuous as though the Crucified, in undisturbed union with God, had
prayed the Psalms and died in the peace of God.
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Moltmann (1974b:203) suggests that Barth’s Christocentrism led him to
“speak almost in theopaschite terms of God’s suffering and being involved in the
cross of the Son.” So much so that in “God’s eternal purpose it is God Himself who
is rejected in His Son. The self-giving of God consists, the giving and sending of His
Son is fulfilled, in the fact that He is rejected in order that we might not be rejected”
(Barth 1957:167). In spite of obvious points of contact between Barth’s theology and
his own, however, Moltmann (1974b:203) ultimately dismisses Barth’s contribution
as being too theo-logically informed inasmuch as it places too much emphasis upon
the ‘oneness’ of God. As such, it must remain, according to Moltmann, an
insufficiently trinitarian exposition of what took place in the crucifixion.
The nub of Moltmann’s (1974b:203) criticism of Barth revolves around his
claim that Barth’s trinitarian theology fails because of its insistence upon maintaining
a distinction between the wholly otherness of God and the God who acts for the
world in Christ, which in trinitarian terms effectively separates the immanent and
economic trinities. In seeking to address this perceived weakness in Barth’s theology,
Moltmann (1974b:203) argues that the God-who-acts (the economic trinity) cannot
be any other than the God-who-is (the immanent trinity). This, of course, was not a
new proposal because fully six decades earlier Hugh R. Macintosh (1913:512) had
argued that the twin concepts of God-for-us and God-as-God-is-within-God’s-ownself are inseparable11. Beyond Barth, Moltmann proceeded to construct a more
integrated incarnational/trinitarian theology of the crucifixion event in which all of
11

This position receives a fuller exposition from Catherine Mowry LaCugna in God for us: The
Trinity and Christian Life (1991). Although she argues that the ‘economic’ and ‘immanent’ Trinity are
potentially misleading terms (1991:23ff), LaCugna (1991:229) concludes that trinitarian theology’s
founding premise must be “that God’s being and God’s being for us may not be separated from each
other” (emphasis added). LaCugna’s views find support in the work of Thomas Torrance (1996:4),
who claims that “God is who he is in the Act of his revelation, and his Act is what it is in his Being.”
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the trinitarian persons participate in the suffering of the event of the cross, a theology
based on the fact that the biblical record presents the story of Jesus with great
emphasis placed upon the relationship existing between two subjects – Father and
Son (Jn 14:11; 17:21). His approach stands over against traditional trinitarian
theologies that tended “to fix or freeze divine self-relatedness as something which
happens inside God but does not immediately touch the world” (LaCugna and
McDonnell 1988:203).
It also stands in contraposition to much Protestant thought which considers
the doctrine of the Trinity to be little more than “a theological speculation with no
relevance for life, a kind of higher theological mystery for initiates” (Moltmann
1974b:237). The issue of the Trinity’s ‘relevance for life’ finds its articulation in the
question whether we can “make something practical and relevant to Christian selfunderstanding out of the way in which God acts towards God?” (Moltmann
1974b:239). His answer is clearly affirmative, though it first involves dispensing
with the distinction of the early Church between God-as-God-is-within-God’s-ownself (i.e., immanent Trinity) and God-as-God-is-for-us (i.e., economic Trinity). In the
end, Moltmann (1974b:245) affirms Rahner’s axiom (1966:87ff) that the economic
trinity is the immanent trinity12, acknowledging in a later work that “I found myself
bound to surrender the traditional distinction between the immanent and the
economic Trinity” (Moltmann 1993c:160).
In clarification of the direction of Moltmann’s thinking here in relation to the
question of divine suffering, it is necessary to appreciate his abandoning of theistic

12

Rahner’s (1974:22) succinct definition of this particular axiom is: “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the
‘immanent’ Trinity and vice versa.”
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notions of God since, when a theology dares to speak of ‘God in Christ’, it must
move, epistemologically speaking, from the external to the internal, and from the
concrete to the abstract, i.e., from what God has done to what God-is-in-God’s-ownself. Moltmann proposes a movement away from a theistic-centred theology toward a
more thoroughgoing trinitarian theology. He argues that this methodological
reorientation is demanded by the fact that talk about the Trinity must be centred upon
the cross of Jesus, not upon resort to speculation in “heavenly riddles” (Moltmann
1974b:207)13, since the death of Jesus constitutes “the centre of all Christian
theology” (Moltmann 1974b:204). In keeping with his earlier emphasis on the
significance of the incarnation as identifying whose death it is upon the cross14,
Moltmann observes that all
… Christian statements about God, about creation, about sin and death
have their focal point in the crucified Christ. All Christian statements about
history, about the church, about faith and sanctification, about the future and
about hope stem from the crucified Christ. The multiplicity of the New
Testament comes together in the event of the crucifixion and resurrection of
Jesus and flows out again from it (Moltmann 1974b:204).

Thus, when the Scripture affirms that Jesus is the image of the invisible God,
this means, according to Moltmann (1974b:205), nothing other than:
… this is God, and God is like this. God is not greater than he is in this
humiliation. God is not more glorious than he is in this self-surrender. God is
not more powerful than he is in this helplessness. God is not more divine
than he is in this humanity.

13

LaCugna and McDonnell argue that speculative approaches to trinitarian theology are not consistent
with the biblical revelation of God. They argue that trinitarian theology would be better served by
acknowledging that it is simply:
… impossible to make true statements about something which is inaccessible to us, viz., the
innermost life of God. This is as it should be. Not a single New Testament text speaks of God
in ‘immanent’ terms. From this we learn that our attention should be directed in trinitarian
theology to the disclosure of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in history (LaCugna and McDonnell
1988:205).

14

Of course, Moltmann is aware of the circulatory involved here insofar as talk of the incarnation
already implies some knowledge of the Trinity (Moltmann 1974b:205).
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In this way the cross stands as the hermeneutical principle that guides
Moltmann’s theology of both the triune God and his views on suffering and
abandonment in creation (Thompson 1994:50).
Here, then, is the major contribution of The Crucified God: while the God of
theism may well provide protection and support for those who suffer, the God who
engages in the suffering of the suffering ones is the only one who is able truly to
identify with them, and to bring life out of death for those who are lost. This is so
precisely because the God who suffers death and who thus shares in the suffering of
the world is resurrected to life and hence brings the promise of hope and resurrected
life to all the godless and godforsaken ones (Moltmann 1974b:216).
While it may be acknowledged that the crucifixion of the Son of God is an
event that is best interpreted from a trinitarian perspective, it remains to be shown
precisely how Moltmann proceeds to argue that God embraces suffering in the event
of the crucifixion of Jesus. For example, in what way have the cries of suffering
humanity been taken up in the cry of dereliction from the cross (Mk 15:34)? What
are the implications of making such claims in the light of the fact that the Christian
theological tradition has largely failed to acknowledge the possibility of divine
suffering? And, ultimately, how is the suffering of humanity redeemed by the divine
suffering that took place at the crucifixion of the Son of God?
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Suffering and the Trinitarian God
The previous chapter has demonstrated how, in The Crucified God,
Moltmann argued that God-as-God-is is revealed precisely through what God has
done in the crucifixion of Jesus so that talk of this event can only be described in
trinitarian rather than theistic terms. Since it is, for Moltmann, at the crucifixion of
Jesus that we most clearly witness the interaction of the divine persons, it comes as
no surprise that Moltmann’s primary focus should be upon the crucifixion of Jesus.
For Moltmann (1974b:204), indeed, the cross is the central criterion of Christian
theology. And it is such not so that we may simply determine what the cross means
for us (soteriology), but that we may learn what the cross reveals about God, and
about God in his relation to us in our suffering and the suffering of the world.
Reflection on the crucifixion leads Moltmann to formulate the central thesis
of The Crucified God with its claim that God does not stand removed from and
unmoved by the suffering of his creation, but willingly embraces that suffering in the
person of Jesus Christ, the crucified/risen one, thereby ultimately redeeming that
suffering. Thus, Moltmann’s choice of title and subtitle – The Crucified God: The
Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology – serves to bring together his twin
ideas of the crucifixion as a trinitarian event whereby the very being of God is
involved in the suffering of the world.
The Christ event on the cross is a God event ... Here God has not just acted
externally, in his unattainable glory and eternity. Here he has acted in
himself and has gone on to suffer in himself (Moltmann 1974b:205).
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This brings our discussion to the very heart of the matter under
consideration: what does Moltmann have to say about the nature of divine suffering
in The Crucified God, and how is that suffering related to the suffering that is all too
present in the created order? Of crucial interest here is the way in which Moltmann
connects the suffering that is embraced by God in the cross of Jesus with that
experienced by all the human victims of exploitation, intimidation, manipulation, and
domination. In a later work, Moltmann (1993c:60) unambiguously states his
conclusion that the “suffering of God with the world, the suffering of God from the
world, and the suffering of God for the world are the highest forms of his creative
love” (emphasis added). His point is that Jesus’ experience of suffering,
abandonment and death during the crucifixion event cannot be anything other than an
integral part of the revelation of the triune God as that God acts to redeem his people.
Accordingly, the crucifixion of Jesus cannot be anything other than a trinitarian
event, a salvific event to be expressed and understood in trinitarian terms (Moltmann
1993c:4).

Biblical Foundations of Moltmann’s Theology of the Suffering God
The New Testament records that God sent his only Son (Jn 1:14, 18) so that
those who believe in him might not suffer the consequences of their sinfulness but
might inherit eternal life (Jn 3:16). That such an act was necessary at all was due to
human beings having sinned and therefore having lost the ability to please God (Rom
8:8), to obey God (Jer 32:23; cf. Dt 6:25), or indeed even to come to God (Jn 6:44).
God acted to bring human beings back into rightful relationship through the
reconciling ministry of Jesus Christ (2 Cor 5:18-20). The question that had engaged
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Moltmann in the prisoner of war camps in Scotland and England concerned the how
of this reconciliation.
The writers of the New Testament claim that the reconciliation of sinful
human beings with God was effected by the triune God through the Father’s
delivering up of his Son (Rom 4:25). This ‘delivering up’ is biblically described as a
multifaceted action whereby God the Father gave up the Son (Rom 8:32), abandoned
the Son (Mk 15:34; Mt 27:46), delivering him to an accursed death (Gal 3:13). More
tellingly, the Son is described as having been “made sin for us” (2 Cor 5:21), “made
a curse for us” (Gal 3:13), bearing the sin of humanity as a sacrifice of atonement
(Rom 3:25; Moltmann 1974b:242). Thus, central to Pauline theology is the notion
that the Son of God was ‘given’ for godless, godforsaken humanity. Moltmann
(1974b:242) interprets Paul here to the effect that:
Because God ‘does not spare’ his Son, all the godless are spared. Though
they are godless, they are not godforsaken, precisely because God has
abandoned his own Son and has delivered him up for them. Thus the
delivering up of the Son to godforsakenness is the ground for justification of
the godless.

For Moltmann, this ‘delivering up’ is not simply a result of an act of the Son
alone. All of the trinitarian persons are involved in the work of redemption. This
‘delivering up’, that is to say, was, according to Moltmann, not simply a matter of a
unilateral action taken by one of the trinitarian persons without consultation, an act
whereby the Father acted as subject and the Son served merely as the object of the
‘delivering up’. He notes, to the contrary, that Galatians 2:20 presents the Son as the
subject of the verb ‘deliver up’, for it is none other than the Son of God who “…
loved me and gave himself for me.” From this it is clear that the Son did not simply
endure suffering in a passive sense, as if the agony of crucifixion were something
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that happened to him. Rather, the Son actively willed to deliver himself into a
situation where suffering would occur (Moltmann 1974b:243).
Moltmann finds supporting evidence for such a reading in the passion
narratives where the Son willed to act in obedience to the will of the Father even to
the point of giving his life (Mt 26:39; Mk 14:36; Lk 22:42). Here the action of the
‘delivering up’ of the Son is not described as an autocratic, authoritarian decision
taken by the Father in isolation, but rather as an action of the triune God whereby
both the Father and the Son will to act in accord. Indeed, in “this event of the giving
up ‘for us’ lies the unity of the Trinitarian self-distinction of God” (Moltmann
1981:54), inasmuch as the mutual indwellingness and conformity of will of the
persons of the triune God guarantee that the delivering up of the Son is as much an
action of the Son as it is of the Father. Moltmann’s position here finds support in von
Balthasar’s (1990:111) claim that a “theology of the delivering up can only be
maintained in a Trinitarian fashion.”
For Moltmann (1974b:243) it is “theologically important to note that the
formula [i.e., the ‘delivering up’ of the Son to crucifixion] in Paul occurs with both
Father and Son as subject, since it expresses a deep conformity between the will of
the Father and the will of the Son in the event of the cross”. Even more startling,
according to Moltmann (1974b:244), is the fact that such a conformity of will
between the Father and Son exists and is made manifest at precisely the point of their
deepest separation, “the godforsaken and accursed death of Jesus on the cross.” This
reveals the paradoxical truth that in community is separation, but a separation
expressive of unity in the divine will so that “in the cross, Father and Son are most
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deeply separated in forsakenness and at the same time are most inwardly one in their
surrender” (Moltmann 1974b:244).
In this way, the death of Jesus on the cross cannot, according to Moltmann,
remain as simply the object of a religiously monotheistic contemplation but can only
be rightly perceived from the perspective of a fully integrated incarnational and
trinitarianly-informed theology. The cross is nothing other than the cross of the triune
God. Thus, Moltmann arrives at a point where he can claim that any talk of the
Trinity must, of necessity, be a discussion of the cross of Jesus; and, conversely, any
talk of the cross of Jesus must also be talk of the relationships existing within the
triune God. There is simply no place in such a scheme for the tendency toward
indulgence in speculation for speculation’s sake (Moltmann 1974b:207). He
concludes that
… the doctrine of the Trinity is no longer an exorbitant and impractical
speculation about God, but is nothing other than a shorter version of the
passion narrative of Christ in its significance for the eschatological freedom
of faith and the life of oppressed nature (Moltmann 1974b:246).

Moltmann and the Traditional Interpretation of the Cross
Throughout The Crucified God Moltmann (1974b:204f; 212f) argues that
Christian theology’s discussion of the crucifixion must, first and foremost, involve a
consideration of what the cross reveals about God in order to reveal the depths of
God’s self-commitment to involvement with the suffering of the world. Any resort to
a simply traditional staurological focus is, for Moltmann, incapable of providing
access to the full significance of what transpired on the cross. This is so, according to
Moltmann (1974b:205), because any theology of the cross must be a theology of the
incarnation, and any theology of the incarnation must be trinitarian. In Moltmann’s
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view, then, the crucifixion of Christ is a God event which takes place between the
abandoned Son and the abandoning Father so that the possibility might exist for all
those who experience abandonment to be reconciled to God through identification
with and incorporation into the Son’s abandonment. Moltmann’s point is, of course,
that the Christian understanding of salvation derives its fullest explication from an
understanding of who it is that hangs upon Calvary’s cross, rather than from a simple
historical recitation of the events leading up to the cross, of how redemption was won
there, and of what significance it had for those who benefit from it.
When the Christian tradition insisted upon approaching the cross with
questions of a soteriological nature its focus was primarily Christological and
expounded in terms of the relationship existing between the two natures of Christ.
Moltmann (1974b:244) points out that if theology insists upon attempting to
understand the cross solely from a Christology dominated by a focus upon the divine
nature of Christ, then all that can be said of the cross is that it is an event between
“God and God.” Ultimately, of course, we will be left with the paradoxical
conclusion that at the cross “God is dead and yet is not dead” (Moltmann
1974b:244). On the other hand he points out that if the suffering and death of Christ
experienced at Calvary is predicated only of Christ’s humanity, as the tradition has
maintained – the divine nature being impassible – this results in a theology in which
the cross is evacuated of deity (Moltmann 1974b:245).
According to Moltmann, then, the tradition’s discussion of the cross fails to
maintain an adequate emphasis upon the essential unity of the two natures of Christ.
When the tradition attempts to answer the soteriological question – what does the
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cross mean for us? – it does so by evacuating the cross of humanity: i.e., the divine
Christ died. And, when considering questions of the relationship between Christ’s
divinity and suffering – what does the cross mean for God? – it answers by
evacuating the cross of deity: i.e., the human Jesus died.
In contrast to the general emphasis of the tradition, Moltmann argues that in
the event of a thoroughly theological interpretation of the cross, Christian theology
will write and speak of it in terms of ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Spirit.’ Whereas a
Christological examination of the cross yields a discussion concerning the
relationship between two qualitatively different natures – i.e., Christ’s divinity and
humanity – an incarnational/trinitarian examination will focus on the relationship
existing between divine persons! Then it will be the case that
… we have not just seen one person of the Trinity suffer in the event of the
cross, as though the Trinity were already present in itself, in the divine
nature. And we have not interpreted the death of Jesus as a divine-human
event, but as a Trinitarian event between the Son and the Father (Moltmann
1974b:245).

The Crucified God, then, in its consideration of God’s relation to human
suffering proceeds from a fundamentally different starting point to that of the
tradition (Moltmann 1974b:245). Moltmann’s particular methodological approach
allows him to inquire into what the crucifixion of Jesus reveals about the nature of
God, dispensing, as it does, with metaphysical and moral concepts of God in favour
of a focus upon relation and the concepts governing relationship. Whereas the
tradition spoke in metaphysical abstractions that had been adopted from Classical
philosophy, and nineteenth century Protestant Liberalism in terms of moral
exemplarism, Moltmann (1974b:245) is freed to speak in terms of the relational unity
existing between the divine persons. That relational unity is constituted by love.
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Moltmann’s attempt to articulate what took place between the Son and the
Father at Calvary is grounded in the love that marks the crucifixion of Jesus as a
uniquely trinitarian event ordered to humanity’s redemption in the overcoming of sin
and suffering.
God allows himself to be forced out. God suffers, God allows himself to be
crucified and is crucified, and in this consummates his unconditional love
that is so full of hope. But that means that in the cross he becomes himself
the condition of this love. The loving Father has a parallel in the loving Son
and in the Spirit creates similar patterns of love in man in revolt. The fact of
this love can be contradicted. It can be crucified, but in crucifixion it finds its
fulfilment and becomes love of the enemy (Moltmann 1974b:248f).

In the immediate wake of Moltmann’s claim that the Trinity was involved in
the event of the cross, a number of theologians were quick to decry such a move as
nothing more than a simple re-presentation of ancient heresies that had been dealt
with by the early church.

Theopaschitism, Patripassianism, and Patricompassionism
When, in The Crucified God, Moltmann (1974b:24) argued that God actively
embraces the suffering of all of creation by participation in those sufferings in the
cross of Jesus, he came very close to adopting some positions which the early Church
Fathers had declared to be heretical.
Two

terms

are

of

particular

concern

here:

theopaschitism

and

patripassianism.
Theopaschitism was the belief, promoted in the writings of John Maxentius
during the sixth century, that one of the Trinity was crucified. Although it is possible
to employ theopaschite language “in a perfectly orthodox sense” (McGrath
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1997:254), it was perceived by some ecclesiastical authorities, notably Pope
Hormisdas (d. 523), that whilst not essentially heretical, such language could be
potentially misleading, so that the formula passed into disuse. Theopaschitism
reappeared in some of Martin Luther’s works and was finally rehabilitated in the
twentieth century through the works of Kitamori and Moltmann. Richard Bauckham
(1977:308), one of the foremost commentators on Moltmann’s work, describes
Moltmann’s theology of the cross as “boldly theopaschite.”
Patripassianism, on the other hand, a far more dangerous heresy, first found
voice during the third century in the writings of Noetus, Praxeas and Sabellius who
claimed, in modalistic fashion, that the Father suffered on the cross as the Son
(McGrath 1997:253). It held, therefore, the suffering of the Son on Calvary to be
nothing other than the suffering and death of the Father, failing “to make a
distinction between the Father and the Son” (Sarot 1990:370). Its roots, therefore, are
located in its failure to make and maintain adequate distinctions between the
trinitarian persons. Patripassianism failed trinitarianly!
In contrast, Moltmann’s whole project in The Crucified God is governed by
an incarnational/trinitarian theology whereby he unambiguously distances himself
from the ancient heresy of theopaschitism, declaring that “Jesus’ death cannot be
understood ‘as the death of God’ but only as death in God” (Moltmann 1974b:207)15.
Elsewhere, the connection between the differentiated suffering of the trinitarian
persons and the redemptive mission of Jesus forms the key to distancing The
Crucified God from claims that it is simply a restatement of patripassianism.
15

Others, however, have not been quite so sympathetic to such subtle distinctions. Klaas Runia
(1984:41), for example, suggests that “Moltmann balances on a tightrope of pure theopaschitism, even
patripassianism.”
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We cannot therefore say here in patripassian terms that the Father also
suffered and died. The suffering and dying of the Son, forsaken by the
Father, is a different kind of suffering from the suffering of the Father in the
death of the Son. ... The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of
the Son. The grief of the Father here is just as important as the death of the
Son. The Fatherlessness of the Son is matched by the Sonlessness of the
Father (Moltmann 1974b:243).

With this, Moltmann avoids the charge of patripassianism by maintaining
sufficient distinction between the nature of the suffering of each of the trinitarian
persons. He is able to maintain these distinctions because of his understanding of the
crucifixion as an event that takes places between divine subjects, utilising relational,
theological language, rather than the abstract conceptualisations of traditional theism.
In so doing, Moltmann’s claim that God suffered at the crucifixion becomes an
articulation of the “deepest theological reality of the event of the cross” (Bauckham
1990:10) because he has in view the suffering of the Father, who suffers the loss of
his fatherhood and the grief associated with the death of the Son, and the suffering of
the Son who dies abandoned by and separated from his Father. Where the Son suffers
pain, abandonment and death, the Father suffers with the Son as the Son suffers. This
is known as empathetic, compassionate suffering or patricompassianism.
Patricompassianism, according to Ngien (1995:245 n.77), is “the theological
position which advocates a trinitarian understanding of the suffering of God,
according to which ‘the Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of the Son’.”
By intentionally and consistently adhering to the principle of patricompassianism
throughout The Crucified God, Moltmann has differentiated the suffering of the
divine persons. Patricompassianism itself has a heritage almost as ancient as
patripassianism, going back to Tertullian16 for whom, indeed, it is simply an
‘improved’ version of patripassianism with its claim that the Father co-suffered with
16

Tertullian. Adversus Praxeas. Corpus Christianorum Series Latina II, 1160, II: 1-4.
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the Son. This divine co-suffering came to be equated with compassion, with the
Father and Son united in the suffering of the crucifixion by virtue of the Father’s
‘suffering in compassion’ with the Son’s suffering.
For Douglas Hall (1986:214), however, Moltmann’s use of the term
patricompassianism cannot be considered an alternative to patripassianism. This is
because, in his view, the Father’s suffering is either suffering in the fullest sense or it
is not. Hall argues that the adoption of some middle approach to the situation is
inadequate for such “ambiguity is hardly clarified by the theological sophistry which
argues that while Jesus “suffered,” as the Creeds declare, God the Father had
compassion; for, as Tertullian observed long ago, what is compassion if it is not
suffering-with?” (Hall 1986:214).
Hall’s objection notwithstanding, Moltmann argues throughout The Crucified
God that it is the principle of compassionate, participative suffering which ultimately
leads to redemption and provides something of an adequate response to the problem
of human suffering and God’s relationship to it.
At this point our discussion passes over to a consideration of how Moltmann
attempts to link the divine suffering of the trinitarian persons at the crucifixion to the
suffering of the created order. Can there be an answer to the question of suffering,
especially the suffering of the innocent, that is simultaneously thoroughly Christian
and authentic enough to honestly face the horrors experienced by its countless
victims? Is it true to say that the one who suffers in their place has redeemed the
suffering of those victims? Furthermore, is it possible to claim, as Moltmann
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(1974a:16f) does, that the cries of the suffering ones are included in Jesus’ death-cry
of dereliction from the cross?

Application to Human Suffering
It is noteworthy that throughout The Crucified God Moltmann consciously
avoids the use of traditional soteriological language which claims that Jesus “died a
righteous man in the place of the unrighteous” (Bauckham 1977:307). For him, the
only fitting answer to questions of suffering and the redemption of suffering is to be
found within the actions of the trinitarian God who redeems dehumanised humanity
by entering into the suffering of humanity. Refusing to remain aloof and distant from
the suffering of creation, as dictated by the theistic conception of “a closed circle of
perfect being in heaven” (Moltmann 1974b:255), God became flesh in the person of
Jesus of Nazareth and entered into the suffering of all creation. This means, as noted
earlier, that all soteriological questions must be given an adequate basis and
contextualisation within statements encompassing the event of the incarnation of
God in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.
Moltmann’s theology in The Crucified God is primarily concerned to provide
a theological response to the problem of suffering by providing an explication of who
it is that acts in the crucifixion of Jesus so that we might gain a greater understanding
of what has taken place there. The Crucified God, therefore, presents a theology of
God’s action at the cross, which is nothing other than a demonstration, for all of
creation, of the conformity of will-to-act on its behalf that exists between the persons
of the Trinity. The crucifixion of Jesus is the event in which God the Father delivers
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the Son over to death as an atoning sacrifice for the sins of the world (Rom 3:25; 1 Jn
4:14). It is also the climax of God the Son’s will-to-act in obedience to the will of the
Father (Mt 26:39; Mk 14:36; Lk 22:42; Heb 9:26). And the Spirit’s presence is
guaranteed by the mutual self-giving of both Father and Son for what “proceeds from
this event between Father and Son is the Spirit which justifies the godless, fills the
forsaken with love and even brings the dead alive” (Moltmann 1974b:244).
Moltmann (1974b:243) argues, as we have seen, that the crucifixion of the
Son of God cannot be understood as an event in which the Son remains passive or is
overtaken by events so as to become merely another victim of fate. Rather, what
takes place in Christ’s passion is an active embracing of the suffering that comes
when he is cast “into the godlessness of Golgotha” (Moltmann 1974b:51). Nor can
the death of Jesus be understood as simply the death of yet another godless man, no
matter how excellent the example of that man’s dying might have been, but as the
death of the one who represents the godless so as to provide the grounds for the
justification of the godless and godforsaken as this is realised in the resurrection of
the crucified one (Moltmann 1974b:242f). Jesus’ crucifixion therefore serves as the
divine identification with, and the redemption of, the suffering of humanity because
at the cross Christ is both beside us, sharing in our suffering and pain, and for us as
he relieves us of the burden of our guilt (Moltmann 1993b:25; 1994:38).
Christ suffers with us and Christ suffers for us. The two images of Christ
belong together. Without the brother in our anxiety there is no fellowship
with Christ. Without the Christ who substitutes for us in our anxiety, we
cannot be freed from that anxiety (Moltmann 1980:50).

Moltmann further argues, again as has been seen, that the Father does not
stand totally unmoved by the events of the crucifixion of his Son either. Throughout
The Crucified God Moltmann is insistent that the Father actively and willingly
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participates in the suffering inherent in the crucifixion – albeit in a differentiated
form to that which the Son experiences. While the “Son suffers and dies on the cross,
the Father suffers with him, but not in the same way” (Moltmann 1974b:203) for the
“Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of the Son. The grief of the Father
here is just as important as the death of the Son” (Moltmann 1974b:243) because the
“Son suffers in his love being forsaken by the Father as he dies; the Father suffers, in
his love, the grief of the death of the Son” (Moltmann 1974b:245). Just as death is
first encountered in an experiential sense, not in our own deaths, but in the death of a
beloved, – “we do not experience death in ourselves but in those we love”
(Moltmann 1973:134) – so God the Father ‘suffered’ the death of God the Son,
suffering the experience of grief at his death. The crucifixion, with the suffering it
involved, is therefore “something that took place between God and God. The
abandonment on the cross which separates the Son from the Father is something
which takes place in God himself” (Moltmann 1974b:151f).
In this way the question of innocent suffering posed at the beginning of this
essay is answered by Moltmann’s (1974b:46) assertion that the ‘problem’ of
suffering “can be summed up by saying that suffering is overcome by suffering, and
wounds are healed by wounds” because Christ’s suffering is not exclusive, but rather
inclusive suffering: our suffering is included in his suffering (Moltmann 1993b:25;
1994:39). This conclusion of The Crucified God is even more clearly expressed in
Moltmann’s (1981:53) later work where he writes
… the Father “did not spare” his own Son … he becomes the Redeemer of
all the Godforsaken. The Father loads the Godforsakenness of the
Judgement onto his own Son in order to give to all the Godforsaken his
grace and eternal presence. … in the giving up and the abandoning of
Jesus by the Father a cleft opens up in God which reaches so deeply that
through it every cleft of sin and of judgement between God and humankind
can be embraced and healed. … The Trinitarian self-distinction of God in

- 51 -

Suffering and the Trinitarian God
the death of the Son on the cross is so deep and so broad that all the lost
and abandoned will find a place in God.

However, despite the profound nature of such declarations we are still faced
with problems that until this point have remained unaddressed. Thus far the
discussion has been approached in an objective and distanced manner. Yet the
subject matter with which we began this inquiry refuses to allow us to remain at
arm’s length from the issues under discussion. For it is not simply a matter of an
academic discussion about the reality of suffering in the created order. Questions of
profound social inequality and injustice are involved here and must also be answered,
for they are all too often found to co-exist with the suffering of the innocent. And
these are the very questions, according to Moltmann (1974b:12-17; 23-25), that lie at
the heart of Christianity’s crisis of relevance and identity.
Moltmann’s theology is unashamedly political as evidenced in the claim that
the God “of the poor, the peasant and the slave has always been the poor, suffering,
unprotected Christ, whereas the God of empires and rulers has usually been the
Pantocrator, Christ enthroned in heaven” (Moltmann 1974b:45f). The powerful are
those who can distance themselves from the harshest realities that the world has to
offer, while the poor have no recourse to the power and resources of the world,
particularly the world of modern technological society. In the light of this, we are
bound to follow Moltmann’s lead and push past the contribution of Kitamori
(1958:52f), who argued that our present human pain is a testimony to the divine pain
already suffered by God on our behalf.
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As he inquires further, Moltmann (1974b:47) enters into a fuller explication
of the question: “Why and in what way did the suffering crucified God become the
God of the poor and abandoned?”
Moltmann is well aware that “the mysticism of suffering can be easily
perverted into a justification of suffering itself” (Moltmann 1974b:48). Nevertheless,
he argues that Christ’s suffering and rejection experienced on the cross combine to
incorporate the godlessness and godforsakenness of the suffering of the poor and
rejected of the world. For while suffering might be considered to be glorious, even
admired and celebrated by some, when that suffering is combined with rejection it
leaves no room for either admiration or glorious appreciation. Rejection is the poison
that makes the bitterness of suffering so deadly (Moltmann 1974b:55). The suffering
Son of God’s experience of rejection was not only to be rejected by his friends and
colleagues, but to be abandoned and rejected by his Father. With this, Moltmann is
concerned to disallow a slide into either asceticism or a simplistic denial of the
reality of the world, however ugly, unjust and inequitable that world may be.
Moltmann (1974b:52) argues that the poor have always only ever looked to
the cross of Christ, while the religious consider the Cross of Christ. Here he is
pointing to a clash of subjectivism and objectivism that takes place when the central
truth of Christianity - the meeting of subjects, Christ and his people – is replaced by a
consideration of Christ as object by the religiously devout, who retain for themselves
the position of subject! Thus, Moltmann (1974b:52) is led to talk of “the church of
the crucified”, which is none other than the church of the oppressed, the poor, the
outcast, those for whom the crucified one died, and who are so often excluded by the
religiously devout.
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Anyone who suffers without cause first thinks that he has been forsaken by
God. God seems to him to be the mysterious, incomprehensible God who
destroys the good fortune that he gave (Moltmann 1974b:252).

Yet Jesus died, according to Moltmann, precisely that the godless ones might,
through participation in the very godlessness of God’s own Son, be drawn into union
with the God who sent his Son that there might be an adoption of many sons and
daughters through faith (Eph 1:5). In effect;
God overcomes himself, God passes judgement on himself, God takes the
judgement on the sin of man upon himself. He assigns to himself the fate
that men should by rights endure (Moltmann 1974b:193).

Here, then, is Moltmann’s answer to the question; how are the cries of the
suffering ones included in Jesus’ cry of dereliction from Calvary’s cross? And to
how those articulations of godlessness and godforsakenness are redeemed by the one
who is, himself, forsaken by his Father.
Moltmann (1974b:277) maintains that the one who follows Jesus has identity
with the crucified Christ because of the intensity of Christ’s suffering on her/his
behalf; for the crucified Christ has experienced the godforsakenness inherent in the
experience of anyone who perceives that God has abandoned or deserted them.
“Anyone who cries out to God in [their] suffering echoes the death-cry of the dying
Christ, the Son of God" (Moltmann 1974b:252). In Moltmann’s view, then, God’s
redeeming love has ensured that the bitterness of all human loneliness and rejection
has been taken into God’s being through the experience of the crucified Christ.
Indeed, in Hegelian terms, Christ’s death is the death of death and the negation of all
negation (Moltmann 1974b:254). In the cross of the crucified Son, God is
“vulnerable, he takes suffering and death upon himself in order to heal, to liberate,
and to impart his eternal life” (Moltmann 1975:645).
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Indeed for Moltmann God’s redeeming love, as made manifest in the cross of
Christ, borders upon the incomprehensible (Haar 1983:28) for it is the crucified God
who provides the possibility of love, the possibility for living with the terror of
history, and for living with guilt and sorrow. These possibilities exist because all
have been taken up into God through the experience of the crucified and godforsaken
Jesus. Even the horror of what took place in “Auschwitz is taken up into the grief of
the Father, the surrender of the Son and the power of the Spirit” (Moltmann
1974b:278). Thus, the very possibility of theology in the aftermath of Auschwitz
exists precisely because God does not stand over and apart from those events, but
rather those events have been incorporated into God through Christ.
God in Auschwitz and Auschwitz in the crucified God – that is the basis for a
real hope which both embraces and overcomes the world, and the ground
for a love which is stronger than death and can sustain death. It is the
ground for living with the terror of history and the end of history (Moltmann
1974b:278).

It was possible for Moltmann to reach this conclusion because, in his view,
Christ’s cry of godforsakenness on the cross includes within itself all the cries of the
innumerable victims of suffering. Accordingly, God is there at the cross as Father
abandons Son, and Son suffers abandonment and death. God enters into suffering,
incorporates suffering into God’s own being through Jesus’ identification with the
godless and godforsaken insofar as the Son of God experiences abandonment by his
Father. Thus, Jesus as the godless and godforsaken one becomes one-inidentification with those who suffer as godless and godforsaken. The divine promise
of Jesus’ resurrection reaches the godless and godforsaken, for Jesus
… humbles himself and takes upon himself the eternal death of the godless
and the godforsaken, so that all the godless and the godforsaken can
experience communion with him (Moltmann 1974b:276)
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Yet simply to remain with Christ’s identification with the suffering of the
godless and godforsaken does not in and of itself explain how that suffering is
redeemed. Here Moltmann’s theological method comes into its own in his
understanding of the cross and resurrection in their dialectical interrelationship. As
with Paul, so with Moltmann. The centre of soteriology is not the cross – as in the
majority of evangelical discourse – but the person of Jesus Christ as the
crucified/risen one. The theology that underpins The Crucified God holds in central
focus both “the resurrection of the crucified Christ, which qualifies his death as
something that has happened for us, and the cross of the risen Christ, which reveals
and makes accessible to those who are dying his resurrection from the dead”
(Moltmann 1974b:204). Thus, in the resurrection Christians behold the crucified one
– interpreting the resurrection through a retrospectively informed hermeneutic – and
in the crucifixion they behold the resurrected one – interpreting the cross by way of
an eschatologically informed hermeneutic (Moltmann 1974b:73-75; 1975:638f).
Within the perspective of Moltmann’s dialectic, then, the sin and suffering of the
entire creation have been dealt with in the cross of the resurrected one precisely
because as crucified he is the one to whom resurrection glory belongs.
Moltmann presents a cogent argument for the incorporation of all of
humanity’s godlessness and godforsakenness grounded in Jesus’ cry of dereliction,
uttered at the point of his existential awareness of the absence of the presence of his
Father. Though on the cross the Father is present in absence, Jesus’ utterance is
nothing other than a cry borne out of the awareness of his own godless and
godforsaken situation (Moltmann 1974b:150f); indeed this exclamation is the
articulation of “the godforsaken Christ’s experience of God” (Moltmann 1993b:23).

- 56 -

Suffering and the Trinitarian God

It is therefore precisely in Jesus’ cry of bewilderment and utter dereliction that the
cries of all of the godless and godforsaken innocent victims of violence are included
in God. However, those cries are redeemed when he, in whom the cries have been
included, is raised from the dead by his Father. Indeed, it is, for Moltmann, true to
say that in Jesus’ cry our cries have meaning, are heard, and are, ultimately,
redeemed through his cross and resurrection.
Jesus’ cry of dereliction (Mk 15:34), moreover, is his participation in the
cries of all of creation – the cry of a longing for redemption (Rom 8:22). Indeed,
Moltmann (1974b:246) goes so far as to claim that Jesus’ cry contains “the whole
uproar of history”. George Hunsinger (1973a:274) argues that here Moltmann
intends that Christ’s cry of abandonment include not only the historical reality of
Jesus’ own abandonment, but also the cosmological protest-cry of the entire creation,
protesting the presence of evil. In that event, then, the eschatological purposes of the
redeeming God are seen to coalesce with the cosmological desire of all of creation
for re-created wholeness in which all things will be made new (Rom 8:19-21). In
fact, there is a continuing teleological uniformity of purpose in the God who
abandons, the abandoned God, and the Christian hope of resurrection that exists
precisely because that God is none other than the Father who, through the power of
the Spirit, resurrects the Son from death: the very same God who creates ex nihilo.
Thus, hope for the whole created order has been made possible because of the
ministry of the crucified one, for God became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth so that,
through him, the possibility might exist for the dehumanised and the inhumane to
attain ‘true’ humanity (Moltmann 1974b:231).
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Therein lies redemption – the possibility of, the power for, and the
actualisation of God’s gift of love in the person of the crucified one given for all
those who are lost and perishing. For although Christians continue to live in the
midst of suffering, Moltmann has shown that it is possible for them to live in the
fullness of the knowledge that Jesus’ suffering of death and estrangement on the
cross together with his resurrection has redeemed those experiences in their lives.
Thus, authentic Christian life in a world wounded by evil is that which is lived with a
steadfastness of faith in an eschatological hope guaranteed by communion/union
with Christ (Jn 3:16; 14:23) rather than a simplistic jubilation over being included
amongst those who are being saved (Moltmann 1971:26).
Moltmann’s thought is a contemporary exposition of Gregory’s17 claim that
what is not assumed is not healed – To gar aproslepton aqerapeuton –
even though Moltmann has consciously reversed the negative formulation of
Gregory’s axiom. It is precisely because Jesus has assumed the experience of
separation from, and abandonment by God, when he embraced evil, suffering and
death, that these experiences of humanity have been healed.
Jesus’ identification with those who are godless and godforsaken, according
to Moltmann, then, is the locus of the soteriological efficaciousness of God’s plan of
redemption. It is because the experiences of suffering and separation have been
redeemed that Christians are able to live in the fullness of a life that comes from
participation in the divine creator of all life. This life, then, can be nothing other than
that which Jesus described as life in the fullest sense (Jn 10:10).

17

Letter to Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius PG 37, 181.
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The Crucified God: critics and criticisms
The previous chapters of this study have centred on an analysis of the
theology presented in The Crucified God and the various personal and contextual
reasons that led Moltmann to give voice to such ideas. They have not thus far,
however, included any attempt to identify or comment upon the weaknesses that
other biblical scholars and theologians have identified in that particular work of
Moltmann’s, a matter which this chapter will now seek to address.
According to Richard Bauckham (1995:15f), one of the foremost
commentators on the theology of Moltmann, there were three crucial steps in
Moltmann’s logic which led him to the conclusion that the cross of Christ is an event
in which God suffered in solidarity with the world. The first was Moltmann’s
insistence that any discussion of the cross must necessarily involve the employment
of a trinitarian theology utilising a language that would place due emphasis upon the
relationships existing between each of the divine persons. The second was his
understanding that the cross “necessitated a doctrine of divine passibility, not only in
the narrow sense that God can suffer pain, but in the broader sense that he can be
affected by his creation” (Bauckham 1995:15). Thirdly, and most controversially,
was Moltmann’s conviction that, if the cross was to have any real significance for the
world, the traditional separation between the immanent and the economic trinities
had to be abandoned. Not only with regard to this latter proposal but on several other
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grounds as well, The Crucified God has, since its publication, been subject to a
number of significant criticisms.
The most serious of these criticisms are concentrated around (1) biblical and
historical matters, (2) Moltmann’s trinitarian theology, (3) concerns raised by
feminist theologians, and (4) issues pertaining to metaphysics.

1a: Biblical Issues
A number of scholars18 have pointed to a series of inconsistencies between
the biblical record and Moltmann’s argumentation in The Crucified God.
Klaas Runia (1984:43-45), for example, presents a series of criticisms, the
first of which questions whether or not the idea of a ‘crucified’ God is consistent
with scripture (Runia 1984:43).
In the first place he argues that Moltmann is correct to dispense with the
overly metaphysical emphasis of the tradition and to move away from the notions of
an apathetic God who remains distant from suffering in the world and the suffering
of Christ. He notes, however, that the scripture itself does not use the phrase ‘the
crucified God’, nor does it refer to ‘the death of God’19.

18

Apart from the criticisms offered by Klaas Runia (1984:43-45) and William Loewe (1977:533)
which will be discussed at length, Carl Braaten (1976:118), John Cobb (1984:174f), Edward
Schillebeeckx (1963:27), and David Coffey (1999:124-127) also take issue with Moltmann’s
treatment of the biblical data.

19

Runia’s critique is supported by Paul Helm’s (1990:128) observation that if anthropomorphisms
must be taken into account by biblical interpreters, then systematic theologians should be wary of
anthropopathisms.
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Runia points out that Moltmann’s repeated reference to the crucifixion as an
event within the Godhead is a claim that is not found in the biblical record. Rather,
the New Testament writers are most particular in their presentation of Jesus as the
Son of God and when “they speak of the crucified One they always speak of him as
the Son of God, never as God” (Runia 1984:43). “When he is forsaken by God,”
therefore, “he does not cry out: ‘My Father, my Father, why hast thou forsaken me?’,
but he cries: “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ It is the man Jesus,
hanging on the cross as our representative, who is forsaken by his God” (Runia
1984:43). Runia (1984:43) concludes that Moltmann “goes beyond the restrained
language of scripture [and finishes up presenting] … a speculative construction” that
shares more with Hegelianism than with the biblical witness.
Secondly, Runia (1984:43) questions whether “Moltmann’s almost exclusive
concentration on the cross is not at the expense of the resurrection.” Runia argues
that even the most casual of glances at the Pauline corpus reveals a gospel that does
not affirm that God suffered in Christ, but rather that God was reconciling the world
to himself (2 Cor 5:19) through raising the crucified Jesus from the dead (cf. Rom
4:24; 8:11; 2 Cor 4:14; Gal 1:1 Col 2:12; 1 Th 1:10). In fairness to Moltmann,
however, it is to be noted that, as with Paul, Moltmann’s treatment of Christ is of
Christ as the crucified/risen one and not simply as Christ crucified.
Thirdly, Runia (1984:44) asks if it possible to speak of death in God? He
argues that the scripture always presents death as the enemy of God, and the New
Testament writers point to the fact that, in Christ’s resurrection, death is destroyed by
God – firstly in Jesus’ resurrection (2 Tim 1:10) and, secondly, in the resurrection of
believers (1 Cor 15:26). Ultimately, one must conclude, according to Runia
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(1984:44), that the scriptures do not present “a trace of the idea that God takes up
death into himself, into his own being.”
Finally, according to Runia (1984:44), Moltmann’s focus upon developing a
theology of the cross and attempt to articulate, theologically, the relational dynamics
of interaction between Father and Son on Calvary to the exclusion of metaphysical
interests, leads to confusion over the function of a two-natures Christology. For
while Moltmann wishes to predicate suffering of God himself – incorporating
suffering into the very being of God – he is nonetheless finally forced to admit the
existence of “a reciprocal relationship between two qualitatively different natures,
the divine nature which is incapable of suffering and the human nature which is
capable of suffering” (Moltmann 1974b:245). Runia (1984:45) argues that although
Moltmann’s concern was to focus attention upon the relationship between the divine
persons at the crucifixion, it was inevitable in such a scheme that the suffering
humanity of the Son be afforded less serious consideration than that of the divinity.
Other biblical scholars have also advanced criticisms of Moltmann’s volume.
William Loewe (1977:533), for example, has pointed to what he considers to be a
key methodological confound in Moltmann’s exegetical work when he, i.e.,
Moltmann (1974b:146), stresses that Jesus’ words of Mk 15:34 are “an interpretation
of the church after Easter”, while, only two pages later, Moltmann (1974b:148)
interprets the words of Ps 22:2 as being words as Jesus spoke them. Loewe
(1977:533) argues that either the words attributed to Jesus by Mark are placed there
as a result of community theologising in a post-Easter context, or they are the words
of Jesus. They cannot, by definition, be both!
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However, in defence of Moltmann, it would appear that Loewe has been
overly selective in his choice of quotation taken from Moltmann’s work. Closer
scrutiny reveals that Moltmann recognises both the influence of the Christian
community and the historicity of Jesus’ words.
Mark 15:34 reproduces the cry of the dying Jesus in the words of Psalm
22.2: ‘My God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ This is certainly an
interpretation of the church after Easter, and indeed Psalm 22 as a whole
had a formative influence on the Christian passion narratives. But it seems
to be as near as possible to the historical reality of the death of Jesus
(Moltmann 1974b:146f emphasis added).

1b: Historical Issues
In terms of historical criticisms of Moltmann’s work, Edward Schillebeeckx
(1980:780) has argued that Moltmann shows scant regard for the historical fact that
the crucifixion was a direct result of the actions of the political and religious
authorities of the day when he ascribes to God “what in fact has been done to Jesus
by the history of human injustice.”
In similar vein, Millicent Freske (2000:94) has argued that The Crucified
God, in its truncated appreciation of the full historicity of Jesus, presents an underdeveloped Christology inasmuch as “suffering God theologies like Moltmann’s
imply that God in no way shared our suffering before Jesus’ crucifixion.” Moltmann,
according to Freske, would seem to locate the entire efficacious content of God’s
redemptive plan in the cross, a claim which, by default, infers that there is nothing
salvific about Jesus’ life-history and ministry prior to the crucifixion20.
20

In her attempt to do full justice to the historical Jesus and to thereby promote an integrated
Christology, Freske draws support from Leonardo Boff’s (1988:119) assertion that
… redemption in Jesus Christ is found neither in his cross, nor in his blood, nor in his death.
Instead, we are redeemed by Jesus’ attitude of love, surrender, and forgiveness. But it was not
only his death that was loving, surrendering, and forgiving. It was his whole life. Jesus’ entire
existence was a “proexistence” – an existence of service to others. It is Jesus’ whole life, then
– and in supreme form, his death, as the organic outgrowth of his life – that is redemptive for
us. His death is the crystallization and maximal expression of his life of service (Luke 22:27)
and love to the end (John 13:1).
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2: Trinitarian Issues
The criticism that The Crucified God has drawn is not only restricted to
biblical/historical matters but extends to questions about the limitations of
Moltmann’s trinitarianism.
Throughout The Crucified God, Moltmann employed a dialectical
epistemological principle that sought to explain revelation in terms of knowledge of
the opposite – the revelation of like in unlike; the omnipotent God as revealed in the
impotency of the crucified one, the love and provision of the Father known in the
resurrection of the one who was abandoned. Later, Moltmann (1996b:104) was to
write that in The Crucified God he utilised a dialectic of radically sharp
contradictions: Christ is known through cross and resurrection, the experience of
God ‘delivering up’ Christ to death, and then ‘raising up’ Christ to life.
However, in The Crucified God, this dialectic was expressed in an
exclusively Christological manner and was, therefore, ultimately found to be, in
Moltmann’s (1996b:104) own words, “theologically inadequate.” This admission is
recognition that his pneumatology had been subsumed under a Christological rubric.
In his later works – commencing with The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of
God (1993) – Moltmann deliberately concentrated upon integrating the
Christological dialectic within a social trinitarianism so as to be more consistent with
the perichoretic mutual indwellingness and reciprocal interpenetration of each of the
divine persons and in this way to give a more properly theological/trinitarian
explication of the cross.
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Nevertheless, Moltmann continues to face several major criticisms of the
trinitarianism presented in The Crucified God. These include the scriptural silence
about the roles of the Father and the Holy Spirit at the crucifixion, the work’s
inadequate, underdeveloped pneumatology, and his theology of the nature and
application of redemptive suffering as applied to God.
With regard to the first of these criticisms, Moltmann (1991b:xvi) himself
readily admits that the scriptural silence surrounding the Holy Spirit’s role in the
crucifixion is a weakness of the trinitarian theology formulated in The Crucified God
to the extent that it has been developed from theological speculation. However,
Moltmann’s admission is merely an admission with respect to the scriptural silence,
because as has been noted previously, he is unconcerned about criticism of the
speculative nature of his theology. That lack of concern derives from the fact that for
a work to be deemed speculative is not, according to Moltmann (1996b:103),
considered a derogative evaluation in German insofar as a speculative treatment of a
subject retains a fully integrated and contextualised view of the topic under
discussion.
The second criticism of Moltmann’s work is, however, a more substantive
one. A foundational motivating factor of his whole enterprise was the desire to
articulate a more thoroughly integrated incarnational/trinitarian theology of the cross
than had hitherto been the case. Moltmann’s intention notwithstanding, The
Crucified God presents an underdeveloped pneumatology, indeed “an inadequate
doctrine of the Holy Spirit” (Campbell 2001)21. Moltmann (1979a:184) himself is
21

This article was accessed in an electronic format and, therefore, individual page breaks and numbers
throughout the article were unavailable. As a consequence, in-text citation of this work does not
include page numbers. However, complete bibliographical data relating to the print version of the
article was available and has been included, in full, in the bibliography.
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aware that his treatment of the Holy Spirit is incomplete. Yet, however inadequate
his treatment of the Spirit might be, The Crucified God is not silent about the role of
the Spirit. On the contrary, the Spirit is presented as the divine love which overcomes
the negative in God’s confrontation with suffering, resolves the dialectic of cross and
resurrection, and opens up the eschatological future for suffering humanity
(Moltmann 1974b:244, 254f). Later, in The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine
of God, Moltmann (1993c:125f) will further identify the Spirit as the agent of
glorification.
Nevertheless, an inadequate pneumatology is not the only consequence of a
lack of attention to the role of the Holy Spirit. Moltmann's project of developing an
integrated trinitarian theology must itself be considered to have failed insofar as the
absence of an adequate pneumatology leads inevitably to the charge that his
presentation is more binitarian than trinitarian. Lyle Dabney (1993:98), for example,
judges that Moltmann has failed to carry his program to its logical conclusion by
failing to provide a detailed treatment of the presence, participation, and person of
the Holy Spirit at the crucifixion of the Son. Dabney’s criticism finds no better
illustration than the following quotation from Moltmann (1974b:243).
To understand what happened between Jesus and his God and Father on
the cross, it is necessary to talk in trinitarian terms. The Son suffers dying,
the Father the death of the Son. The grief of the Father here is just as
important as the death of the Son. The Fatherlessness of the Son is
matched by the Sonlessness of the Father, and if God has constituted
himself as the Father of Jesus Christ, then he also suffers the death of his
Fatherhood in the death of the Son. Unless this were so, the doctrine of the
Trinity would still have a monotheistic background.

We see here, in Moltmann’s own words, that despite the fact that the cross
can, for Moltmann, only be understood in trinitarian terms, his discussion is limited
to matters concerning the Father and the Son – the Spirit does not rate a mention!
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What transpires on the cross is an event between God and God (Moltmann
1974b:244), and not “between God and God and God” (Dabney 1993:98 emphasis
added). In the end, according to Dabney (1993:99), “Moltmann’s account of the God
of the cross in The Crucified God is little more than binitarian.”
The importance of these concerns has not been lost upon Moltmann
(1991b:174), in his earlier (than Dabney’s criticism) acknowledgement that
I did not get further than seeing a binity of God the Father and Jesus the
Son of God. Where was the Holy Spirit, who according to the Nicene Creed
is to be worshipped and glorified together with the Father and the Son?

While Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity as presented in The Crucified God
has been considered unique because of its insistence that the cross is “internal to
God’s own trinitarian experience” (Bauckham 1995:155), a third criticism relates to
his understanding of the Son as godless and godforsaken as expressive of Jesus’
experience of the absence of relationship between Son and Father (Moltmann
1974b:245ff). In assessing this criticism it is crucial to note that for Moltmann the
phrase ‘the godless and the godforsaken’ is understood to apply not only to the Son,
but to all persons that the Son dies for and rises to new life before so that the
experience of the godless and godforsaken one is the means by which new life is
brought to all those who also suffer godlessness and godforsakenness.
Moltmann’s critics, however, insistently argue that appropriate care must be
exercised when presuming to talk about the abandoned Son of God as ‘godless.’ Paul
Zahl (1998)22, for example, suggests that the term ‘godless’ refers, not to Christ, but

22

This article was accessed in an electronic format and, therefore, individual page breaks and numbers
throughout the article were unavailable. As a consequence, in-text citation of this work does not
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to those who have come to the end of their works only to discover that their
resources are insufficient to achieve their own salvation. Ernst Käsemann23 is even
more emphatic, claiming that it is unacceptable to suggest that the crucified Christ be
counted among the ‘godless’, for God’s servants (including the suffering Christ)
should not be so casually included in the same breath as the unfaithful.
However, in Moltmann’s defence, it is true to say that when he applies the
twin terms, godless and godforsaken, to God’s Son he is attempting to articulate what
is taking place in the subjective realm of Jesus’ experience. He is in no way inferring
that, in any objective sense, Jesus has been consigned to godlessness and
godforsakenness without the possibility of hope for redemption. Moltmann is simply
pointing to the reality that, in Jesus’ experience, there was an absence of the presence
of the Father during those hours of agony spent upon Calvary’s cross. At the same
time, and given his dialectical treatment of the matter, his readers are meant to
recognise that, with the mutual interpenetration and indwellingness of the divine
persons, there is no possibility that the Father could be anywhere other than
immediately present to the Son as he is crucified.
This observation highlights the centrality of the cross to Moltmann’s
trinitarianism to such an extent that there could be no possibility that he would be
able to maintain any sense of the traditional distinction between the immanent and
the economic trinities (Moltmann 1974b:239f). Thus, where Rahner (1966:87ff)
argues that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, Moltmann’s trinitarian

23

Quoted in Zahl 1998. This article was accessed in an electronic format and, therefore, individual
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theology asserts that God is what God is for-us (Moltmann 1974b:203f, 245f). As a
result and because the experience of God in the world effects change within the
trinitarian relations – as the means by which change is effected in the world – there
was no possibility, for Moltmann, that a doctrine of the immanent Trinity could
survive, at least in any recognisable form. In Moltmann’s theology, the immanent
Trinity is indeed collapsed into the economic Trinity: God, as God-is-within-God’sown-self, is what God-is-for-the-world, in the cross of the crucified Son of God. This
formulation, however, left him open to the criticism that “from The Crucified God
onwards [Moltmann] seems unable to resist [the temptation], to see the cross as the
key to the doctrine of God, not only in the sense that it reveals God as the kind of
God who is willing to suffer, but in the sense that the actual sufferings of the cross
are essential to who God is” (Bauckham 1987:109) with implications for his
predication of godlessness and godforsakenness of the Son.
Certainly Moltmann (1991b:xvi) has admitted that this particular feature of
his trinitarianism did lead to a problem with his presentation of a theology of
atonement. It is clear that his use of the double expression ‘the godless and the
godforsaken’ as applied to Christ was intended to refer to Christ’s identification with
the plight both of sinners and those who are the innocent victims of pointless
suffering. Yet, while Jesus may readily be identified as standing in solidarity with
those who are powerless and who suffer, his identification with those sinners who are
the perpetrators of violence and injustice is, according to Moltmann’s critics, far less
certain. For them, the problem remains the identification of Jesus with the
perpetrators of violence as well as with its victims, a problem overcome, to
Moltmann’s satisfaction at least, by means of his dialectical method whereby all the
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evil in the world, whether suffered or inflicted, is transformed and forgiven in being
subsumed into the being of God.
The history of God [for Moltmann, the sum of the relations of the persons of
the Trinity] contains within itself the whole abyss of godforsakenness,
absolute death and non-God. …Because this death took place in the history
between Father and Son on the cross of Golgotha, there proceeds from it
the spirit of life, love and election to salvation. The concrete ‘history of God’
in the death of Jesus on the cross of Golgotha therefore contains within
itself all the depths and abysses of human history … There is no suffering
which in this history of God is not God’s suffering; no death which has not
been God’s death in the history on Golgotha. Therefore there is no life, no
fortune and no joy which have not been integrated by his history into eternal
life, the eternal joy of God (Moltmann 1974b:246).

The question of the perpetrators of violence apart, an associated problem
relates to Moltmann’s alleged depiction of the Father as being somehow himself a
perpetrator of violence in the infliction of suffering upon his Son, an issue raised
especially by Moltmann’s feminist critics.

3: Feminist Issues
The feminist critique of The Crucified God centres upon a two-fold
allegation: first, that Moltmann’s views of God and the Trinity are founded upon
unhelpful patriarchal presuppositions and, second, that these presuppositions
inevitably lead to the glorification of suffering.
Elizabeth Johnson (1985:153) points out that the abandonment experienced
by the Son of God is mistakenly attributed to God the Father when the cross is
presented as an event between God and God, in which God abandoned God
(Moltmann 1974b: 151, 242, 243). She quotes Edward Schillebeeckx’s (1980:780)
summary of Moltmann's theology as claiming that
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… Jesus not only shows solidarity “with publicans and sinners”, with the
outcasts and those who are everywhere excluded; not only has God
identified himself with the outcasts; no, God himself has cast him out as a
sacrifice for our sins (emphasis added).

A consequence of this line of thinking, according to Johnson, is that it
finishes up ascribing to God’s agency what was in fact “something inflicted on Jesus
by an act of human injustice”(Murphy 1988:157). Such thought also contains the
potential to lead to a confused interpretation of the nature of divine love revealed by
Jesus Christ inasmuch as it depicts “the Father in an act of sadism” (Johnson
1985:153). Indeed, according to Dorothee Sölle (1975:26f), The Crucified God
places the Father in the invidious position of facing the charge of divine child-abuse
so that one has to question whether Moltmann’s God is anything other than God the
executioner24.
Feminist theologians hold that these images could only arise out of a theology
thoroughly indebted to its patriarchal foundationalism. For Rita Brock (1989:42), for
example,
… patriarchy is the encompassing social system that sanctions child abuse.
Theologically, the patriarchal family has been and continues to be a
cornerstone for christological doctrines, especially in father-son imagery and
in the unquestioned acceptance of benign paternalism as the norm for
divine power.

Not only does the Father stand accused of cosmic child abuse and sadism, but
a central feature of the feminist critique of The Crucified God is that it inevitably
produces a form of Christianised masochism (Sölle 1975:9-32). Indeed, Freske
(2000:94) argues that Moltmann has produced a “glorification of suffering” with the
unfortunate implication that if “you believe that acceptance of suffering gives life,

24

Sölle’s claim in repeated by John Macquarrie (1980:6) who argues that, within The Crucified God,
the “ghost of God the executioner is still lurking on the fringes.”
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then your resources for confronting perpetrators of violence and abuse will be
numbed” (Brown and Parker 1989:18).
According to these authors, the scripture records that throughout his life Jesus
actively spoke against those who perpetuated injustice (e.g., Mt 21:12f), so that
Moltmann’s concentration upon the cross to the exclusion of Jesus’ life serves to
diminish the prophetic role of Jesus. This means that what Jesus did throughout his
life to alleviate and overcome suffering is subordinated to what Jesus as Saviour
effects upon the cross, so that, in Moltmann’s scheme of things, his humanity
becomes subservient to his divinity and the efficaciousness of redemption is firmly
locked into the events of the crucifixion and resurrection. This in turn serves to
attribute the redemptive role to suffering as such.
By confusing ‘suffering with’ with action that does something about evil
instead of asserting that testifying for life is what sustains justice, the
suffering God theologies continue in a new form the traditional piety that
sanctions suffering as imitation of the holy one. Because God suffers and
God is good, we are good if we suffer. If we are not suffering, we are not
good. To be like God is to take the pain of all. In this form of piety, pain
becomes attractive – the more we suffer the more we can believe we
approach God. By interpreting Jesus’ suffering as a sign that chosen
suffering is salvific the Suffering God theology baptizes violence done by
people resistant to grace and abundant life, and uses Jesus’ death to invite
people to be open to all of life. This theology is offensive because it
suggests that acceptance of pain is tantamount to love and is the foundation
of social action (Brown and Parker 1989:19).

Nancy Victorin-Vangerud (1997:100) adds that Moltmann’s view of
reconciliation is dominated by an emphasis upon vertical rather than horizontal
reconciliation25. That is, Jesus’ crucifixion, in Moltmann’s thought, has effected
reconciliation between God and humans, but fails to address the need for
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators of violence. She claims that a focus
25

It should be noted that Victorin-Vangerud’s article interacts with Moltmann’s The Spirit of Life: A
Universal Affirmation (1992) in the first instance. Nevertheless, her comments are worthy of inclusion
because they are just as applicable to the theology presented in The Crucified God.
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upon “a once-and-for-all eschatological reconciliation beyond history deters attention
from the unrealised needs for reconciliation in the present” (Victorin-Vangerud
1997:101). Accordingly, she argues that what is missing from “Moltmann’s model is
the direct confrontation, struggle and transformation between estranged people”
(Victorin-Vangerud 1997:100).
Feminist critiques of The Crucified God hinge upon the perception that it is
the Father who gives up, who betrays, who abandons the Son at the cross while it is
the Son who is given up, who is betrayed, and who is abandoned. These criticisms,
however, are countered by Moltmann’s (1974b:241-246) argument for the active as
opposed to passive suffering of both the Father and the Son, in his attempt to move
away from the tradition’s understanding of God as apathic. Indeed, Moltmann
(1974b:243f) answers some of these criticisms within The Crucified God itself when
he accentuates the perichoretic nature of the trinitarian wills – the Father never
operates independently of the Son or the Spirit. Rather, the mutuality of divine willto-mission coalesce in the Father’s will-to-send and the Son’s will-to-go – the
Father’s sending being constituted by the Son’s going and vice versa. The unity of
the will-to-act within God is impervious to the suggestion that the Father abandoned
the Son to death as an act of an authoritarian and abusive figure simply because the
divine will is governed by a principle of mutuality of surrender. The Son surrenders
himself to injustice, abandonment and death while the Father surrenders the Son to
the godlessness and godforsakenness of Calvary’s cross.
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4: Issues Pertaining to Metaphysics
Moltmann has also been criticised on account of the metaphysics that
underlie his trinitarian discussions in The Crucified God. The most significant of
these criticisms suggest that his theology of divine suffering inevitably leads toward
tritheism and the eternalisation of suffering.
In the first instance John O’Donnell (1982:165) asks, “[i]s this doctrine
thritheistic?” The question derives from a perception that Moltmann’s trinitarian
theology is so focussed upon the operation of the divine persons as subjects (who are
united perichoretically) that their ontological unity is seriously compromised. John
Thompson (1994:51), indeed, argues that Moltmann’s work suffers from “a serious
lack of an ontological dimension to his trinitarian formulations.”
George Hunsinger (1973a:278) advances a similar criticism in suggesting that
“Moltmann’s theology is an attempt to move from a theology of being to a theology
of act, from static categories and spatial metaphors to dynamic categories and
temporal metaphors.” What has taken place, according to Hunsinger, is that the very
unity of the Father and Son is constituted in act. This results in the act of
abandonment being nothing other than a separation of being, which is overcome by
the life-giving action of the Spirit. Because the divine unity exists in the actions of
the trinitarian subjects, and the abandonment of the Son is the result of an act of both
Father and Son, then not only is the person of the Son separated from the person of
the Father, but the being of Father and Son is also separated by that act. Hunsinger
(1973a:278) concludes that this scheme leads inevitably to tritheism – “three Gods,
separate in being, yet united in intention. The unity of the Trinity seems to be
volitional, but not ontological.”
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A second criticism has to do with the incorporation of suffering into the
divine being. The Crucified God presents the reader with the view that God’s
trinitarian being is constituted by a dialectic that exists between the divine love and
will to redeem, and the godlessness, godforsakenness and death of the Son
(Bauckham 1987:107f). The result of this dialectic is that suffering is taken up into
the divine being through the experience of both the Father and the Son, since both
suffer – albeit differentially. The danger inherent in such a move – a danger alluded
to in the feminist critique of Moltmann’s work considered earlier – is that by
incorporating suffering into the divine being, suffering itself is glorified and
eternalised. It is for this reason that Edward Schillebeeckx “rejects the possibility of
incorporating suffering into the being of God” (Murphy 1988:157), concluding that it
is not possible to
… follow Jürgen Moltmann in solving the problem of suffering by
eternalising suffering in God, in the opinion that in the last resort that gives
suffering some splendour (Schillebeeckx 1980:780).

Against these criticisms, it is crucial that Moltmann’s intention be rightly
understood. His goal in The Crucified God is to argue that the suffering of all of
creation has been redeemed, because suffering itself has been transmogrified through
the resurrection and thereby incorporated into the life of God. It has been taken into
God through the Son’s experience of rejection, abandonment and death on the cross,
and through the Father’s experience of grief at the death of the Son. But, and this is
central to Moltmann’s dialectical argument, the suffering and death that is taken into
God is not the same suffering and death that led Jesus to the cross precisely because
the one who suffered death on the cross is none other than the resurrected one. And,
the resurrection heralds “the annihilation of the power of death” (Moltmann
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1974b:170) for the suffering of Christ is the power of God and the death of Christ is
God’s potentiality (Moltmann 1974b:215). Suffering and death are, in consequence,
permanently changed. Helen Bergin (1986:208) comments:
It is important to remember that when Moltmann uses the words
“eternalising suffering” he is speaking of a God that is victorious over the
evil, especially over the evil of Jesus’ death, and thus he can speak of this
conquered evil becoming a part of the divine being. It is the glorified
suffering that is in God, not a suffering that is destructive or threatening.

Many of the criticisms of The Crucified God presented above have been
addressed by Moltmann himself in subsequent works, and by other scholars and
theologians. However, not all of the issues have been resolved to the satisfaction of
the majority of writers, nor have some of the issues requiring further investigation
been satisfactorily addressed. This leaves open a number of avenues for further
research as indicated toward the end of the conclusions provided in the next chapter.
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This study sought to examine the theology of the cross in Jürgen Moltmann’s
seminal work, The Crucified God, a volume that has been described as one of the
most important contributions to recent Christian theology (Macquarrie 1980:6).
Specifically, the essay sought to determine what Moltmann had to say regarding the
nature of the relationship between God and suffering.
On the basis of Moltmann’s understanding that the crucifixion of Jesus is a
trinitarian event in which all three members of the Godhead participate, The
Crucified God provides a contemporary response to the theological problem, which
according to Moltmann, poses the most profound challenge to the Christian church’s
identity and relevance: the presence of evil in the world and the suffering of the
innocent both of which, seemingly, contradict Christian theology’s traditional
assertion that God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent.
Moltmann’s foundational move in response to the theodicy question and the
problem of suffering was to invoke and utilise a dialectical theological method – the
understanding of revelation occurring in its opposite – thus providing a basis from
which to argue that the cross of Christ has profound relevance for a suffering world.
For if, according to dialectical theology, God is made known in that which stands in
opposition to God, then the omnipotent God is revealed in the impotency of the
crucified one, while the apparent abandonment of the Son by the Father confirms the
unity of both Father and Son’s will-to-act in response to the world’s suffering made
fully manifest in the resurrection of the abandoned/suffering Son of God (Moltmann
1974b:28).
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Through his adoption of a theological dialectic, Moltmann’s point is not so
much that the cross reveals God’s will-to-save as that the crucifixion of the Son of
God is the revelation of who God is so that Moltmann (1974b:200-207) argues for a
revolution in Christian theology’s explication of the doctrine of God based upon the
scriptural record of Jesus’ passion, since the “person who wants to say who God is
must … tell the passion story of Christ as the story of God” (Moltmann 1974a:16
emphasis added). For only “when we are clear as to what happened on the cross
between Jesus and his God can it be clear who this God is for us and for our
experience” (Moltmann 1972a:282). Hence central to Moltmann’s inquiry was the
role that the cross plays as the key to God’s relation to the suffering of the world as
focussed in the question: “Does an impassible God keep silent in heaven untouched
by the suffering and death of his child on Golgotha, or does God himself suffer these
pains and this death?” (Moltmann 1997a:18).
Moltmann insists, by way of answer, that the crucifixion of Christ is the
primary locus of the revelation not only of what God has done, but also of who God
is. And, as such, the cross of Jesus can only be interpreted by a theology that is
sufficiently incarnational because, according to Moltmann (1974b:203-207, 151f,
244f), the crucifixion is an event between God and God. Indeed, in Moltmann’s
(1974b:203-207) view, this God-event is nothing other than an event within the life
of the Trinity itself through which both the Father and the Son experience suffering
in the process of redeeming creation.
Not only has suffering been experienced by God, argues Moltmann
(1974b:254), but through the crucifixion of the Son of God, suffering and death have
been taken into God. Utilising the dialectic of cross and resurrection, Moltmann
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(1974b:277) argues that human suffering has been assumed and transformed through
its assumption into the very being of God, with the consequence that there is now
nothing that can exclude those who live in communion with Christ from participating
in the fullness of life of the trinitarian God. For Moltmann, the Son’s experience of
abandonment to godlessness and godforsakenness, in the event of his crucifixion,
provides the grounds for God’s identification with all of those who suffer, while his
resurrection from the dead provides the possibility of justification for all those who
follow his invitation to obedience.
As a result, human suffering has been engaged, defeated, and finally
redeemed through the willed, active suffering of a God who does not stand removed
from the sufferings of creation but embraces the full horror of history’s countless acts
of inhumanity and suffering in the event of the cross (Moltmann 1974b:277). In
consequence, there is “no suffering [that] can separate us from our fellowship with
God who suffers with us” (Moltmann 1993b:25).
Suffering, therefore, cannot be said to be meaningless insofar as God himself
has engaged suffering and given it meaning in the person of Jesus. Indeed, in terms
of God’s engagement in the suffering of the world, scripture’s description of Jesus as
the image of the invisible God points precisely to the depths of divine involvement in
the mystery of suffering insofar as, according to Moltmann (1974b:205), it means,
when applied to the cross, nothing less than:
… this is God, and God is like this. God is not greater than he is in this
humiliation. God is not more glorious than he is in this self-surrender. God is
not more powerful than he is in this helplessness. God is not more divine
than he is in this humanity.
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Moltmann (1974b:214) arrives at such a conclusion through his dismissal of
the metaphysical emphases of traditional theism in favour of the biblical revelation
of a relational God who is passionately involved in redeeming his people from the
suffering of alienation. This involved commencing his theological inquiry from a
fundamentally different starting point to that of traditional Christian theism
(Moltmann 1974b:245).
Yet Moltmann’s invitation to Christian theology to re-consider its doctrine of
God, and to revisit theopaschitism in an attempt to do justice to the whole question of
the relationship of God to the suffering of creation has met with substantial and
sustained criticism. The Crucified God’s most significant claim – that the cross is a
trinitarian event in which all three persons of the Godhead suffer – is firmly disputed
by many scholars and theologians in its contradiction of traditional theism’s assertion
of God’s essential aseity and impassibility.
These criticisms notwithstanding, the value of Moltmann’s legacy, born out
of a desire to achieve greater relevancy for Christian theology’s statements about the
presence of evil and innocent suffering in the world, remains in his attempt to
reinstate the crucifixion of Jesus as the central and foundational criterion of Christian
theology. In this respect, Lyle Dabney (2000:148) remarks that while Moltmann
“may not have all the right answers, … he has something more important, the right
questions” (emphasis added).
The strength of The Crucified God lies in the fact that it “recognises the need
to describe God as receptive and suffering as well as active [so that] … Moltmann’s
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way of theology has the merit of breadth of vision and continued openness to
dialogue and discussion” (Campbell 2001)26.
Moltmann (1987:viii) himself has claimed that his theological writings, of
which The Crucified God is but one volume, are not an attempt to say all that there is
to say about any one topic but that they are rather to be seen as contributions to
theological discussion. It is in that sense that Moltmann’s theology is profoundly
dialogical.
Inasmuch as Moltmann invites his readers to engage in a process of
theological discussion, the opportunity is taken here to suggest some ways in which
his contribution in The Crucified God might be developed and extended.

Avenues for Further Research
Among potential avenues for further research and investigation Lyle
Dabney27 (cited in Moltmann 1991b:xvii) and Nancy Victorin-Vangerud
(1997:passim) have argued that The Crucified God presents an inadequately
developed pneumatology.
One of the ways in which The Crucified God’s pneumatology is considered to
be deficient is in the way in which Moltmann’s treatment of the third person of the
26

This article was accessed in an electronic format and, therefore, individual page breaks and numbers
throughout the article were unavailable. As a consequence, in-text citation of this work does not
include page numbers. However, complete bibliographical data relating to the print version of the
article was available and has been included, in full, in the bibliography.
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D Lyle Dabney completed his doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jürgen Moltmann.
Dabney’s dissertation, Die Kenosis des Geistes: Kontinuität zwischen Schöpfung und Erlösung im
Werk des Heiligen Geistes, was recently published in German (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener
Verlag, 1997) however it is yet to be made available in an English translation.
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triune God leads to a de-personalisation of the Holy Spirit. While the personhood of
the Father and the Son is accentuated in Moltmann’s incarnational soteriology, the
Holy Spirit appears to be reduced to not much more than an impersonal force acting
between Father and Son. Moltmann’s (1974b:245, 277) assertion that the Spirit
issues forth from the combined experience of grief of the Father and Son
equivalently reduces the Spirit to the Father and Son’s combined will-to-act, or,
alternatively, the grieving love that is shared between Father and Son.
Without diminishing the importance of what Moltmann has said about the
nature of divine suffering and its relation to the suffering of creation in The Crucified
God, it is important that his project be brought to completion. Moltmann’s
(1974b:205) claim that the crucifixion of Jesus is an event within the life of the
trinitarian God remains to be developed into a fully trinitarian theology where the coequality of each of the divine persons is adequately demonstrated and maintained.
The presence, participation and personhood of each of the divine persons at the
crucifixion is demanded not only by a trinitarian theology of the cross, but also by a
theology which claims that all of the acts of God are trinitarian: from creation,
through redemption, to the eschatological climax of all things.
Nevertheless, Moltmann’s contribution to Christian theology in The Crucified
God – the exploration of the reality of suffering in the created order and what God
has done about it – can never be reduced to being merely yet another piece of
academic theology. The Crucified God is a treatment of the cross that portrays a God
who bears full identification with the suffering of creation and of the innocent, with
those who are abused and desecrated by the corruption and inhumane horrors
endemic to human history. Not only has this God identified with those who suffer,
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Conclusion

but, according to Moltmann, the trinitarian God who suffers at the cross of Jesus has
also provided the means by which those victims of innocent suffering might be
redeemed and restored to wholeness. And this because it is possible, in the light of
Moltmann’s contribution, to claim that God assumes Our Cries in His Cry for
… anyone who cries out to God in this suffering echoes the death-cry of the
dying Christ, the Son of God (Moltmann 1974b:252).
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